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The Jurisdiction Canon 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl* 
This Article concerns the interpretation of jurisdictional statutes. The 
fundamental postulate of the law of the federal courts is that the federal courts 
are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. That principle is reinforced 
by a canon of statutory interpretation according to which statutes conferring 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction are to be construed narrowly, with 
ambiguities resolved against the availability of federal jurisdiction. This 
interpretive canon is over a century old and has been recited in thousands of 
federal cases, but its future has become uncertain. The Supreme Court recently 
stated that the canon does not apply to many of today’s most important 
jurisdictional disputes. The Court’s decision is part of a pattern, as several 
cases from the last decade have questioned the canon’s validity, a surprising 
development given what appeared to be the canon’s entrenched status. 
This state of flux and uncertainty provides an ideal time to assess the 
normative merits and the likely future trajectory of the canon requiring 
narrow construction of jurisdictional statutes. This Article undertakes those 
tasks. First, it conducts a normative evaluation of the canon and its potential 
justifications. The normative evaluation requires consideration of several 
matters, including the canon’s historical pedigree, its relationship to 
constitutional values and congressional preferences, and its ability to bring 
about good social outcomes. Reasonable minds can differ regarding whether 
the canon is ultimately justified, but the case for it turns out to be weaker than 
most observers would initially suspect. Second, the Article attempts, as a 
positive matter, to identify the institutional and political factors that have 
contributed to the canon’s recent negative trajectory and that can be expected 
to shape its future path. These factors include docket composition, interest-
group activity, and the Supreme Court’s attitude toward the civil justice 
system. 
This Article’s examination of the jurisdiction canon has broader value 
beyond the field of federal jurisdiction because it sheds some incidental light 
 
 *  Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. For helpful comments on earlier 
versions, I thank Arthur Hellman, Michael Herz, Lonny Hoffman, Anita Krishnakumar, Richard 
Re, and participants at the Legislation Roundtable sponsored by Cardozo Law School and St. 
John’s Law School. I thank Paul Hellyer for tracking down some obscure sources. I thank 
Benjamin Holwerda for research assistance. 
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on the more general questions of why interpretive rules change, how 
methodological changes spread through the judicial hierarchy, and how the 
interpretive practices of the lower courts vary from those of the Supreme Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The cardinal principle of the law of the federal courts is that 
the federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Countless cases stand for that principle, including what is perhaps the 
most renowned case in all of American law, Marbury v. Madison.1 
Although Marbury is famous for its broad pronouncements about the 
power of judicial review, the Supreme Court’s more specific ruling was 
that a federal statute had given the Court a type of jurisdiction that 
was not authorized by Article III of the Constitution.2 Article III 
empowers the federal courts to hear only certain categories of 
disputes, and, as Marbury reminds us, it provides the first and most 
fundamental limitation on federal judicial power. But the Constitution 
is not the only constraint. In addition, and much more important as a 
matter of daily practice, a federal court’s exercise of authority must 
comply with the jurisdictional statutes, which usually confer much 
less jurisdiction than the Constitution would allow.3 Thus the federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction twice over. 
This Article concerns an important corollary to the limited-
jurisdiction principle. That corollary holds that the statutes setting 
forth federal subject-matter jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed.4 
That is, when the meaning of a jurisdictional statute is ambiguous, 
vague, or otherwise uncertain, the courts are to interpret the statute 
so as to err on the side of restricting federal judicial authority. This 
interpretive rule is one of the established presumptions or 
 
 1.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2.  Id. at 173–76. 
 3.  See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution 
and statute . . . .”). An exception to the rule that jurisdiction requires both a constitutional and a 
statutory basis, though not a practically significant exception today, involves the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction. That constitutional grant of authority is regarded as self executing. 
See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3525 (3d ed. 2008). 
 4.  See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (“The policy of the statute [setting 
forth a required amount-in-controversy for federal jurisdiction] calls for its strict construction.”); 
Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We strictly construe statutes 
conferring jurisdiction. . . . [I]f there is ambiguity as to whether the instant statute confers 
federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable, narrow construction.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kresberg v. Int’l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 
(2d Cir. 1945) (“[T]he well established rule [is] that federal jurisdiction is not to be extended 
beyond the scope permitted by a strict construction of the statute upon which it rests.”); Surface 
Am., Inc. v. United Sur. & Indem. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D.P.R. 2012) (“As courts of 
limited jurisdiction, federal courts are bound to construe jurisdictional grants narrowly.”); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Co. v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1567 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (referring to “the canon that 
a congressional grant of jurisdiction should be read narrowly”).  
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“substantive canons” governing statutory interpretation. Leading 
authorities on federal practice call the narrow-construction canon a 
“familiar proposition,”5 and the federal courts recite some version of 
this canon in hundreds of rulings every year.6 That makes it one of the 
most frequently cited substantive canons in the federal courts’ 
interpretive toolkit.7 
Despite its seemingly solid footing in the federal courts, the 
rule of narrow construction has lately come under threat. Just because 
a rule of federal practice has been familiar to courts, litigants, and 
commentators for decades, and has been repeated thousands of times, 
does not mean it is immune from abrogation. Recall the fate of the 
practically sacred language governing dismissal of a complaint for 
failure to state a claim: the complaint should not be dismissed, as 
generations of lawyers learned, “unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”8 That formulation, despite its familiarity 
to virtually every litigator in the country, was “retired” by the 
Supreme Court in 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.9 
If the Supreme Court’s treatment of the jurisdiction canon over 
the last decade or so is any guide, the canon may be headed for a 
similar fate. The canon has not (yet) been forced into retirement, but 
 
 5.  See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3602.1, at 135 (3d ed. 2009) (“It is a familiar 
proposition that the constitutional policy of limited jurisdiction requires that the statutes 
granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts be strictly construed.”); see also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1206 (5th ed. 2014) (citing a canon of “[n]arrow 
construction of federal court jurisdictional grants that would siphon cases away from state 
courts”). 
 6.  It is impossible to give a precise figure, in part because electronic databases do not 
include every district court opinion. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. 
L.J. 515, 519–25 (2016). Nonetheless, one can find hundreds of invocations of the canon in 
federal cases by running a search such as “federal /p jurisdiction /s (strict! or narrow!)” in West’s 
All Federal Cases (ALLFEDS) database. For 2014, this search returns nearly one thousand 
results. Many of the results are false positives, but reviewing a sample of the results allows one 
to conclude that the number of true hits is in the hundreds. The canon is especially prevalent in 
federal decisions involving attempts to remove cases from state court to federal court.  
 7.  Precise rankings are impossible because of the imprecision of word searches and the 
incompleteness of databases. The rule of lenity, probably the other leading contender for most 
frequently cited substantive canon, also appears hundreds of times a year in federal decisions. 
And unlike the jurisdiction canon, the rule of lenity appears frequently in state cases as well. 
State courts only rarely interpret federal jurisdictional statutes, such as when a federal statute 
provides for jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts. Such situations have sometimes led 
state courts to cite the narrow-construction canon. E.g., State v. F/V Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245, 
1252–53 (Alaska 1984); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Betts, 518 P.2d 385, 387 (Kan. 1974). 
 8.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 9.  550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (stating that the “no set of facts” language had “earned its 
retirement” and should be forgotten). 
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the Court’s December 2014 decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 
Co. v. Owens10 counts at least as a demotion to part-time status. The 
Court stated in Dart Cherokee that the narrow-interpretation canon 
does not apply in cases involving removal to federal court under the 
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which is the most important new 
jurisdictional statute of this century.11 Had the Court stopped there, 
its ruling would have been significant but not especially surprising, for 
CAFA’s purpose was to expand jurisdiction, and, as the Court 
explained, Congress apparently wanted the new jurisdictional 
provisions to be interpreted generously.12 But the Court did not stop 
there. Rather, the Court also referred, ominously, to the presumption 
against federal jurisdictional in its more general form as merely a 
“purported” rule whose very existence was up for grabs.13 Though less 
explicit than Dart Cherokee, other Supreme Court cases from roughly 
the last decade have also cast doubt on the jurisdiction canon’s 
validity, and not only in CAFA cases.14 Perhaps the canon has enough 
history and inertia behind it to survive, albeit in a diminished state, 
but this moment of flux provides an opportunity to study the 
jurisdiction canon in a comprehensive way. 
This Article undertakes that comprehensive study by assessing 
the jurisdiction canon both normatively and descriptively. The 
normative analysis will consider whether the canon is justified and, if 
it is, on what grounds. This requires examination of several kinds of 
possible justifications, including those rooted in history, policy, 
constitutional values, and congressional intent. The normative 
evaluation shows that the case for the jurisdiction canon is shakier 
than one might guess given the canon’s familiarity. Because the case 
for the jurisdiction canon is close and contestable, whether the canon 
is justified may depend on how highly one values stability and, 
concomitantly, how heavy a burden one puts on proponents of change. 
The descriptive analysis will seek to explain what has put the 
canon under threat in recent times and, tentatively, to predict its 
future trajectory. The canon has faced some headwinds lately: recent 
congressional activity has mostly favored expanded federal 
jurisdiction, and influential business groups have campaigned against 
the canon in an effort to increase their access to the federal courts. At 
 
 10.  135 S. Ct. 547 (2014). 
 11.  See id. at 554; see also infra Sections II.C, III.C (discussing CAFA’s goals and 
significance). 
 12.  See 135 S. Ct. at 554. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  See infra Section II.A.1.b (discussing Supreme Court cases that questioned or neglected 
the narrow-construction canon). 
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the same time, the canon will likely retain a base of support in the 
lower courts due to its familiarity and its tendency to serve those 
courts’ interests in reducing caseloads. One difficulty in predicting the 
canon’s future at this particular moment is that debates over access to 
the civil litigation system are quite politicized, perhaps increasingly 
so. The jurisdiction canon may have become a topic, like abortion and 
affirmative action, regarding which the political commitments of new 
Justices can make a difference. 
This Article aims to yield at least two types of payoffs. First, 
comprehensive study of one of the most frequently cited substantive 
canons is useful in its own right, especially when the canon is in a 
period of uncertainty and potential reevaluation. Indeed, this canon 
would particularly benefit from study because, as a canon used mostly 
by the lower courts, it tends to escape the notice of Supreme Court–
oriented scholarship (i.e., most statutory interpretation scholarship).15 
Second, the discussion sheds light on some broader debates in 
statutory interpretation, such as whether the canons are binding 
“law,”16 why interpretive rules emerge and evolve,17 and how changes 
in interpretive methodology spread through a judicial hierarchy 
composed of courts with somewhat differing roles and interests.18 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth addressing a 
source of skepticism about the canons generally. Although the various 
canons and maxims of interpretation are constantly invoked by courts, 
there is the nagging worry that these purported rules—like other 
rhetoric found in judicial opinions but to an even greater degree—are 
mere post hoc rationalizations for decisions that were actually reached 
 
 15.  See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To Read a Statute in a 
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 436–38 (2012) (explaining that scholarship in the field of 
statutory interpretation has traditionally focused almost entirely on the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 16.  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907–18, 1968–90 (2011) (discussing the nature of 
interpretive methodology); see also infra Section II.A.2 (explaining that lower courts treat the 
jurisdiction canon as precedential in ways that challenge the conventional account of the 
jurisprudential status of the canons). 
 17.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (discussing the 
development of new canons in the Rehnquist Court); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory 
Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001) (seeking to explain interpretive change on the basis 
of shifting expectations of actors in the interpretive system); see also infra Section II.A.1 
(discussing how the jurisdiction canon developed), Part III (discussing structural and ideological 
factors that are influencing the trajectory of the jurisdiction canon). 
 18.  See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React 
When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 
546–58 (2015) (discussing how changes in interpretive methodology are transmitted from the 
Supreme Court to the lower courts); see also infra Sections III.A–B (explaining why lower courts 
may be more favorably disposed toward the jurisdiction canon than is the Supreme Court). 
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for other reasons. This view finds its most famous expression in 
Professor Karl Llewellyn’s classic article on the canons, with its chart 
pairing many of the canons of interpretation with competing canons 
pointing the opposite direction, which was meant to show that the 
canons themselves could not direct decisions.19 More recent work, 
proceeding in a more systematic empirical fashion, has likewise cast 
doubt on the ability of the canons to constrain judicial preferences, at 
least in certain contexts.20 
The skeptical account has some force to it, but the strongest 
versions of the skeptical view of the canons go too far in disparaging 
the canons’ role. At a minimum, the prevailing interpretive rules and 
frameworks make certain decisional pathways easier to follow by 
providing ready-made intellectual shortcuts and fostering habits of 
mind that favor certain outcomes over others.21 Especially in cases 
with low ideological stakes or in situations in which the time available 
to reach a decision is limited, presumptions favoring one outcome 
probably do guide decisions to an important degree.22 Those 
conditions—of low stakes and little time—tend to be the norm in lower 
courts.23 So even if the canons (and other legal doctrines, for that 
matter) are employed sporadically and opportunistically in the 
Supreme Court, which tends to be the skeptics’ focus, the canons can 
have some real bite in the lower courts, which is where the vast bulk 
of cases are decided. Moreover, even setting aside case outcomes, the 
canons affect how judges must justify their decisions and how 
attorneys must fashion their arguments, both of which are important 
in their own right.24 
If the strongest forms of canon skepticism are overstated, that 
does not mean we should swing to the other extreme and adopt the 
 
 19.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
 20.  See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 96–108 (2005). 
 21.  See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1976 
(2005) (stating that methodological propositions are dicta rather than binding holdings but that 
they are nonetheless practically important in shaping later decisions). 
 22.  See, e.g., Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the 
Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2012) 
(providing experimental evidence that reducing the time available for decisionmaking increases 
the likelihood that decisionmakers will follow legal constraints).  
 23.  See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 9–10 (2013). 
 24.  See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). Even Llewellyn said that the canons “are still needed tools of 
argument.” Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 401. 
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naïve view that the canons are wholly autonomous external 
constraints that follow their own timeless logic. Although the skeptics’ 
goal is presumably to direct our attention away from the canons 
altogether and instead toward the “real” determinants of judicial 
decisions, crediting the skeptical account with some truth actually 
makes the canons interesting in new ways. Particular canons move 
into and out of vogue, expand or contract, as a result of various 
contextual influences, including evolving judicial attitudes. Thus, if 
the Supreme Court becomes more inclined to favor expansive federal 
jurisdiction, then it will tend to ignore or reject the narrow-
construction canon. That does not mean the canon has no significance. 
On the contrary, the use (or disuse or modified formulation) of the 
canon helps to convey, to litigants and lower courts, the high Court’s 
preferences regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction in a way that 
transcends the outcome of a particular case. In other words, we can 
think of changes in the use of a canon as an expression of the balance 
of forces of the day and as a means of communicating changes through 
the judicial system.25 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I sets the stage for 
what follows by providing some brief introductory remarks about the 
jurisdiction canon. The normative and descriptive aspects of the study 
are found in Parts II and III respectively. The Conclusion provides 
some broader observations about statutory interpretation and 
interpretive change. 
I. DEFINING THE JURISDICTION CANON 
It is useful to begin by explaining more clearly what the 
narrow-construction canon is and what role it plays in statutory 
interpretation. 
A. Various Aspects of the Presumption Against  
Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
As noted at the outset, the fundamental postulate of the federal 
courts is that they are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Growing out of that proposition is a cluster of ideas regarding 
procedure, evidence, and statutory interpretation. This collection of 
ideas is sometimes called the presumption against federal 
 
 25.  See generally Bruhl, supra note 18, at 546–58 (discussing how changes in interpretive 
methodology are transmitted to the lower courts). 
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jurisdiction26 or, in the removal-jurisdiction context in particular, the 
presumption against removal.27 For purposes of analysis, we need to 
disentangle the various components of this presumption. 
To begin with, one aspect of the presumption against 
jurisdiction is the proposition that courts should assume that a case 
lies outside of federal subject-matter jurisdiction until jurisdiction is 
established. The need to establish jurisdiction then requires various 
procedural rules for how to overcome the initial presumption: who 
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, using what documents, 
at what stage of the case, and so on. Today, most of those procedural 
rules reinforce the initial no-jurisdiction starting point by placing 
various obstacles in the way of jurisdiction: for example, a plaintiff 
filing in federal court must allege jurisdictional facts in the complaint 
and then be prepared to prove them if challenged, the parties cannot 
consent to jurisdiction, and a defect in jurisdiction can be raised for 
the first time on appeal.28 
In addition to functioning as a starting point, a presumption 
against jurisdiction can also act as a factual tie-breaker. In civil 
disputes that reach trial, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his 
or her case on the merits by a preponderance of the evidence, and if 
the fact-finder believes the evidence is in equipoise on any element, 
the plaintiff should lose.29 Similarly, when a jurisdictional fact must 
be proven by a preponderance, jurisdiction fails when the evidence is 
evenly balanced.30 
The topic of this Article is a different aspect of the presumption 
against jurisdiction, namely a rule of statutory interpretation. It is 
conventional to divide interpretive canons into several categories, 
most prominently textual canons and substantive canons, the latter 
being a collection of background principles and presumptions that 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Renne v. 
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991); Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 
1974). 
 27.  See, e.g., Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 
2001); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias 
Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 636–37 (2004). 
 28.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1), 12(h)(3); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 
U.S. 178, 188–89 (1936); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3522, at 122.  
 29.  32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1627 (2016). 
 30.  See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015); Meridian Sec. 
Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2006). Note that jurisdictional facts that overlap 
with the merits may be subject to lenient, prima facie standards of proof in order to prevent an 
early judicial inquiry into jurisdiction from determining the plaintiff’s ultimate entitlement to 
relief on the merits. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1006–
11 (2006). 
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promote certain interests or policies.31 The canon calling for narrow 
construction of jurisdictional statutes is a substantive canon that 
promotes a policy of limiting federal judicial authority. Substantive 
canons are often phrased as interpretive presumptions—the 
presumption against retroactivity, the presumption that Congress 
does not pass statutes violating international law, etc.32 In order to 
distinguish the interpretive canon governing jurisdictional statutes 
from the other aspects of the presumption against federal jurisdiction 
described above, I will typically refer to it as “the jurisdiction canon,” 
“the narrow-construction rule,” or the like. 
To provide an example of the jurisdiction canon in operation, 
consider the following scenario: a plaintiff sues a defendant in state 
court, and the defendant then impleads a third party who, according 
to the original defendant, is required to reimburse the defendant if the 
defendant is found liable to the plaintiff. This new party, the third-
party defendant, wishes to remove the suit to federal court. If the 
requirements for federal jurisdiction are otherwise satisfied, can this 
party remove even though the original defendant did not? If binding 
precedent within the relevant jurisdiction did not already provide an 
answer, a court’s analysis of the question would certainly give careful 
consideration to the text of the removal statute, which provides that 
“the defendant or the defendants” may remove.33 One obvious question 
is whether the third-party defendant is a “defendant” within the 
meaning of the statute. Purely as a linguistic matter, the answer is 
probably yes and no: the third party is a defendant on the impleader 
claim but is not an original defendant in the plaintiff’s complaint. In 
light of this uncertainty, the court might rely on legislative history, 
precedents that address related situations, practical consequences, or, 
most relevantly here, a substantive canon. It is unclear whether this 
kind of party is a “defendant,” the court could reason, and so the court 
should read the statute narrowly—that is, against federal 
jurisdiction—so as to permit only an original defendant, but not a 
third-party defendant, to invoke the court’s removal jurisdiction.34 
This is of course just one illustration; the canon features prominently 
in many disputes over the scope of the jurisdictional statutes.35 
 
 31.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 1195–1215 (categorizing canons this way). 
 32.  See id. at 691–92 (listing examples of substantive canons phrased as presumptions). 
 33.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012). 
 34.  See First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2002) (relying heavily 
on the narrow-construction canon to reach the result described in this paragraph). 
 35.  See, e.g., Baldy v. First Niagara Pavilion, C.C.R.L., LLC, 149 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557–63 
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (repeatedly citing the narrow-construction canon in addressing an unsettled 
question of removal procedure). 
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A different formulation of the presumption against jurisdiction 
also deserves mention. Courts very often make statements to the 
effect that all “doubts” should be resolved against federal jurisdiction 
or, specifically in the context of removal jurisdiction, that all doubts 
should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.36 When opinions 
say this, sometimes they appear to be invoking a tie-breaker rule for 
close factual disputes or a procedural rule allocating the burden to the 
party invoking jurisdiction.37 Other times they appear to mean that 
uncertainties about the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes 
should be read against jurisdiction (i.e., they are invoking the 
jurisdiction canon).38 And in many instances it is just hard to know 
which rule or combination of rules courts mean to invoke when they 
say doubts are resolved against jurisdiction. Because of this ambiguity 
about the meaning of the “doubts” formulation, I generally avoid it. 
A final point: I have been speaking of the jurisdiction canon, in 
the singular, as a rule applicable to the interpretation of jurisdictional 
statutes generally. That is how courts have usually understood the 
canon. (Courts invoke the canon with particular frequency when it 
comes to removal jurisdiction,39 but that is just a particular 
manifestation of the broader rule.) One could imagine an alternative 
interpretive regime in which different jurisdictional statutes carry 
with them different interpretive rules (this statute interpreted 
broadly, this one narrowly, this one neutrally, etc.). In fact, the 
jurisdiction canon seems to have gained its initial prominence, more 
than a century ago, as a rule about the interpretation of the 1887 
amendments to the jurisdictional statutes, and then it generalized 
from there.40 Further, it may be that we are headed toward a world in 
which the jurisdiction canon becomes fractured into multiple, varying 
rules applicable to different jurisdictional statutes; that possibility is a 
topic to which we will return later.41 
 
 36.  E.g., Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014); Salton v. 
Polyock, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035 (N.D. Iowa 2011). Electronic database searches reveal many, 
many examples. 
 37.  E.g., Rindels v. Tyco Integrated Sec., LLC, No. CV 14-6536 RSWL (CWx), 2015 WL 
469013, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015). 
 38.  E.g., Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
 39.  See Haiber, supra note 27, at 636 (“[R]arely does a decision concerning removal not 
begin with some variation of the axiom dictating strict construction of removal jurisdiction.”). 
 40.  See infra Section II.A.1.a. 
 41.  See infra Sections II.G, III.E. 
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B. The Meaning and Significance of Narrow Construction  
of Jurisdictional Statutes 
Courts sometimes describe the jurisdiction canon as one calling 
for “narrow” construction of jurisdictional statutes, but it is more 
common for them to speak of “strictly” construing such statutes. What, 
if anything, is the distinction between narrowness and strictness?42 
In the abstract, it is a bit unclear what it means to read a legal 
text “strictly.”43 The notion of strict construction sometimes has been 
used as a crude synonym for reaching politically conservative results, 
especially in the context of constitutional law.44 In part because of 
such political connotations, it might be advisable not to use the 
terminology of strict construction at all. Nonetheless, courts and 
commentators often use such language, and when they say that 
jurisdictional statutes are to be construed strictly, that means that 
jurisdictional statutes are to be read so as to resolve uncertainties 
against the existence of jurisdiction—that is, to give a narrower rather 
than a broader scope to federal judicial jurisdiction. Judicial usage 
confirms this rough equivalence between strictness and narrowness, 
as courts using the jurisdiction canon sometimes switch between the 
two terms.45 And, of course, the notion of strict construction has an 
ancient pedigree in statutory interpretation. One of the oldest rules of 
 
 42.  One might also wonder whether there is a difference between strict/narrow 
interpretation and strict/narrow construction. Especially in constitutional theory, commentators 
sometimes distinguish between the two activities, defining interpretation as the discovery of 
semantic meaning and construction as the imputation of legal content. This distinction is not 
often made by legislation scholars or by courts using the jurisdiction canon, and so following 
their lead I will use the terms “interpretation” and “construction” interchangeably. If, however, 
one does attend to the distinction, it is probably more appropriate to categorize the jurisdiction 
canon as a rule of construction rather than interpretation. In that regard it resembles most other 
substantive canons, though it is possible that some substantive canons can reflect or become 
conventions that bear on semantic meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 111–14 (2010). 
 43.  Cf. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Strict Construction and Judicial Activism, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Mar. 8, 2015), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/03/legal-theory-
lexicon-strict-construction-and-judicial-activism.html [https://perma.cc/8T6Z-UYTT] (providing 
several possible meanings of the concept of strict construction in the context of constitutional 
law). 
 44.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 n.* 
(1980). 
 45.  E.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We strictly 
construe statutes conferring jurisdiction. . . . [I]f there is ambiguity as to whether the instant 
statute confers federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable, 
narrow construction.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Robinson v. Ortho-
McNeil Pharm., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 838, 842 (S.D. Ill. 2008) (stating that removal statutes 
“must be strictly and narrowly construed”); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 1206 
(referring to the jurisdiction canon as a rule of “[n]arrow construction”). 
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interpretation, the rule of lenity, is often stated as a rule that penal 
statutes are to be strictly construed.46 Many other substantive canons 
have likewise traditionally been phrased as rules of strict 
construction—statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly 
construed, for example—and this is understood to mean those statutes 
should be read narrowly rather than expansively in close cases.47 So, 
strict construction of jurisdictional statutes is, for our purposes, 
interchangeable with narrow construction. 
Still, one might wonder how exactly one is to know the 
difference between a narrow/strict reading on the one hand and a 
broad/liberal reading on the other, much less how one is to distinguish 
either one from a merely “normal” reading. The old treatise writers 
filled many pages discussing such questions, as they had to, given that 
so much of traditional statutory interpretation consisted of 
designating certain classes of statutes as subject to either strict 
interpretation or liberal interpretation.48 This is not to say the old 
writers, or even modern ones, have arrived at a precise, fully 
satisfying resolution. At a minimum, statutes subject to strict 
construction are not subject to purposive expansion—that is, reading 
them beyond their terms in order to reach cases that present the same 
mischief.49 A different way to express the idea of strict construction, 
which one also finds in the treatises, is to say that a statute subject to 
strict construction is triggered only when purpose and language 
coincide: “[N]o cases shall be held to fall within [the strictly construed 
statute],” the treatise writer William Maxwell explained, “which do 
not fall both within the reasonable meaning of its terms and within 
the spirit and scope of the enactment.”50 Still another way to capture 
the idea is to say that words subject to strict interpretation should be 
limited to their prototypical applications (a sparrow is a prototypical 
bird, shooting a gun is a prototypical way to “use” a gun) rather than 
encompassing cases that may fit within definitional criteria but are 
located at the periphery of the concept (like a penguin as an example 
 
 46.  See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88. 
 47.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 690–91. 
 48.  E.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION §§ 191–240 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1882); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE 
ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291–383 (N.Y.C., John S. Voorhies Law Bookseller & Publisher 1857); J.G. 
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 346–431 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 
1891). 
 49.  SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 243–44, 246–47 
(London, William Maxwell & Son 1875). 
 50.  Id. at 238. 
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of a bird or trading a gun for drugs as “using” a gun).51 A further 
difficulty in defining the jurisdiction canon concerns its relationship to 
textual clarity and other interpretive considerations. A powerful form 
of the canon would be capable of overriding the most natural reading 
of the text in favor of a less natural (but still plausible) reading, while 
a weak version would apply only when two competing meanings 
remain roughly equally plausible after considering all permissible 
resources. 
We should not worry too much about the difficulties inherent in 
expressing the precise meaning of narrow construction or explaining 
how exactly it fits into the process of interpretation. Those difficulties 
are not unique to this canon; on the contrary, knowing which cases a 
canon covers, at what stage it should be applied, how much weight to 
give it, and so forth are problems that afflict interpretation generally. 
Such questions have not yielded simple, consistent answers.52 Perhaps 
in the end some canons of interpretation are best understood as 
directions to approach a statute in a certain mood, with an attitude of 
generosity on the one hand or stinginess on the other. In any event, as 
stated at the outset, the use of a canon can act as a signal of a court’s 
mindset and as a means of communicating its attitudes to other courts 
and litigants. From that point of view, the precise technical operation 
of a canon is not so important; what matters is whether it tends to be 
mentioned and affirmed on the one hand or ignored and questioned on 
the other. 
II. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE JURISDICTION CANON 
The jurisdiction canon has been repeated thousands of times, 
but its justifications are rarely stated, much less scrutinized. Is the 
canon defensible? If so, why? Only because it has been repeated so 
often? This Part explores those questions. 
There are several potential justifications for an interpretive 
rule that loads the dice against exercises of federal judicial 
jurisdiction. The justification could rely on a descriptive claim about 
what Congress wants (or would probably want if it thought about the 
matter). Or the justification could be more openly normative, 
appealing to judicial notions of sound policy whether or not Congress 
endorses them. Or perhaps we could understand the canon as a softer 
 
 51.  See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 62–74 (2010) (discussing the 
linguistic concept of prototypical meaning). 
 52.  See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226–30, 367–75 (2011); Amy Coney 
Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117–18 (2010). 
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form of constitutional law, a rule that has the power to push statutes 
away from the outer bounds of Article III authority. This Part of the 
Article will canvas and evaluate a variety of potential justifications for 
the jurisdiction canon, including arguments of the sort just mentioned. 
I should state at the outset, however, that some of the arguments 
about the canon do not lend themselves to easy resolutions, as they 
reflect abiding disagreements about the role of the federal courts and 
the relative importance of stability versus other values. Yet even when 
ultimate verdicts are hard to reach, it is still useful to lay out the 
competing considerations in a systematic way. 
The normative analysis does not begin with a blank slate. Ours 
is a system based on precedent and tradition, and so history can settle 
a matter even if it would be resolved differently as a de novo matter 
today. Therefore, one should begin with what has come before. 
A. Precedent and History 
This Section traces the jurisdiction canon’s development and 
asks whether it should survive as a matter of stare decisis or, less 
formally, because the canon has deep roots in the past that have 
generated practices and expectations that current courts should 
respect. Recounting this history also has independent value because 
the story of the development of the canon is not widely known. 
1. A History of the Jurisdiction Canon 
The canon of narrow construction of jurisdictional statutes has 
been cited so much that one might assume it to be ancient and 
unchanging. Some canons may be that way—such as linguistic 
maxims that capture some of the truth of ordinary usage—but many 
canons are neither timeless nor immutable. On the contrary, they 
evolve: federalism presumptions bulk up into clear-statement rules,53 
canons regarding agency deference expand to new domains,54 and so 
on.55 The jurisdiction canon too has a history. And the history is 
shorter and more uneven than many would suspect. 
 
 53.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 619–29. 
 54.  E.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57–58 
(2011) (holding that Chevron deference doctrine applies to judicial review of Treasury 
regulations). 
 55.  See Barrett, supra note 52, at 127 & n.84 (citing examples of substantive canons that 
evolved over time); Bruhl, supra note 18, at 507–46 (discussing various instances of canonical 
change). 
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a. The Slow Development of the Canon 
We can begin with the canon’s English antecedents. The 
mother country did not have parallel federal and state courts as we do, 
but it did have a multiplicity of courts of varying jurisdiction and a 
legislature that could create, alter, or abolish those jurisdictions.56 The 
courts tended to disfavor legislative tinkering with jurisdiction, and 
this disfavor generated what we could call substantive canons of 
interpretation. The judges presumed that Parliament did not create 
novel jurisdictions by implication, and they accordingly read 
jurisdictional grants narrowly, against jurisdiction in cases of doubt.57 
At the same time, in the same conservative spirit, the courts also 
applied a rule disfavoring implied ousters of established jurisdiction.58 
Although this history provided the materials that one could 
imagine being translated in this country into an interpretive canon 
disfavoring federal jurisdiction, the now-familiar narrow-construction 
canon did not immediately spring into life in anything resembling its 
current form. It is true that the federal courts were recognized, very 
early, to be courts of limited jurisdiction and, concomitantly, that they 
were presumed to lack jurisdiction until its existence was shown.59 
That much should sound familiar, for modern courts say the same 
things.60 Nonetheless, many familiar features of modern law that are 
thought to follow from those basic propositions—such as the rule that 
jurisdiction can be questioned at any time,61 the rule that the party 
invoking jurisdiction must prove jurisdictional facts if challenged,62 
 
 56.  See generally W.S. HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (A. L. Goodhart & H. 
G. Hanbury eds., rev. 7th ed. 1956) (discussing the development and jurisdictions of England’s 
many courts). 
 57.  FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF 
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
652 (London, William Benning & Co. 2d ed. 1848); MAXWELL, supra note 49, at 110–12, 264–66. 
 58.  DWARRIS, supra note 57, at 652; MAXWELL, supra note 49, at 105–10. 
 59.  For an early example, consider Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 
(1799), in which the Court observed:  
A circuit court [i.e., the federal trial court at the time] . . . is of limited jurisdiction: 
and has cognisance, not of cases generally, but only of a few specially 
circumstanced . . . . And the fair presumption is (not as with regard to a court of 
general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, 
but rather) that a cause is without its jurisdiction, until the contrary appears. 
Id. at 10. 
 60.  E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 
limited jurisdiction . . . .” (citing Turner, 4 U.S. at 11)). 
 61.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3522, at 122. 
 62.  McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188–89 (1936). 
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and so forth—were not embraced at the beginning.63 Rather, the early 
federal practice, which was partly influenced by the limitations of 
common law procedure, provided that proper pleading of jurisdictional 
requisites created a prima facie case for jurisdiction that the other 
side bore the burden of factually rebutting and, further, that a party 
could forfeit the chance to object to jurisdiction by failing to make a 
timely objection.64 Some of these pro-jurisdiction procedural rules, 
which seem foreign to us now, persisted for quite some time.65 
As for interpretations of the scope of the subject-matter 
jurisdiction provided by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and other early 
statutes, the Supreme Court’s record was mixed. In some cases, one 
sees narrow constructions of jurisdictional statutes, such as in the 
famous early case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss (1806), which concerned 
the interpretation of the ancestor of the modern diversity statute.66 
Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the statute to require what we 
would today call “complete” diversity of citizenship, that is, that each 
plaintiff be diverse from each defendant. The opinion was very brief. It 
did not cite any interpretive canon, or other interpretive tools for that 
matter, but the fame of Strawbridge might lead some to think that 
narrow construction was the uniform practice all along. Yet that is not 
the case. Some other early cases, which unlike Strawbridge are mostly 
forgotten today, favored broad interpretations of federal jurisdiction, 
including the diversity jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.67 In any 
event, one does not find in the early Republic a well-established 
interpretive canon of narrow construction of the sort one finds 
constantly repeated in lower-court cases today. 
After the foundational Judiciary Act, the next critical period in 
the development of federal jurisdiction came during and shortly after 
the Civil War. In response to the War and its aftermath, Congress 
enacted a string of statutes expanding the federal courts’ jurisdiction, 
 
 63.  See generally Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1830 
(2007). 
 64.  Id. at 1839, 1876–77. 
 65.  Id. at 1870–71. Collins suspects that these practices persisted not just because of the 
strictures of common-law pleading rules but because the Supreme Court wished to broaden 
access to federal courts. Id. at 1882–83. 
 66.  7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 67.  See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 
837 (1988) (stating that the Court took a “relatively aggressive stance” in construing certain 
aspects of diversity jurisdiction, though the Court was cautious in other respects); see also id. at 
843–45 (providing examples of expansive interpretations of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts). In one of the cases cited by White, an attorney argued for a canon of liberal 
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction; Chief Justice Marshall’s terse opinion ruled in favor of 
jurisdiction but did not cite such a principle. Young v. Bryan, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 146, 149, 151–
52 (1821). 
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including removal provisions aimed at protecting federal officials, 
Union supporters, freedmen, and others who could not expect fair 
treatment from the state courts in the South.68 Later, in 1871, 
Congress enacted new legislation providing federal remedies and 
jurisdiction for violations of civil rights.69 But the Civil War and 
Reconstruction period also saw jurisdictional expansion motivated by 
quite different goals, namely congressional Republicans’ plan to 
promote economic development by (among other things) expanding 
commercial interests’ access to national courts.70 The era’s most 
significant enactment, from the jurisdictional perspective, was the 
landmark 1875 statute that gave the federal courts their now-familiar 
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law and further expanded 
opportunities for removal from state courts.71 
New statutes require interpretation, and one would expect the 
interpretive activity occasioned by the new jurisdictional legislation to 
provide an opportunity for the development of interpretive canons. Yet 
while there was plenty of interpretive activity occurring, no clear 
interpretive canon for jurisdictional statutes developed. In some cases, 
the Supreme Court responded sympathetically to the legislative goal 
of expanding access to the national courts, especially for railroads and 
other national enterprises.72 Indeed, the Court at times described the 
legislature’s expansions of federal jurisdiction as “remedial” in nature 
and, according to the traditional rule for remedial statutes, gave the 
statutes a liberal construction in order to accomplish Congress’s 
goals.73 Treating the statutes as remedial in this way would, of course, 
run directly contrary to the modern notion that jurisdictional statutes 
 
 68.  FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 61 (1928); STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND 
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 147–54 (1968). 
 69.  See, e.g., 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3573, at 547, 554 (discussing the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871). 
 70.  See KUTLER, supra note 68, at 157–60; Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use 
the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 511, 516–17 (2002); William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial 
Power, 1863–1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 342 (1969).  
 71.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 68, at 
64–65.  
 72.  See KUTLER, supra note 68, at 156–58; Gillman, supra note 70, at 518–19; see also 
Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 
729–30 (1986) (explaining that the Supreme Court and lower courts gave the removal provisions 
of the 1875 Act a broad and enthusiastic reading). A notable broad reading of the defendant’s 
right to remove came in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), which 
interpreted the 1875 Act to permit defendants to remove state-law claims based on the 
defendants’ federal corporate charter. 
 73.  E.g., Home Life Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) (“[T]he [1867 
removal] statute is remedial, and must be construed liberally.”). 
2-Bruhl_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:54 PM 
2017] THE JURISDICTION CANON 517 
should be construed narrowly. Yet in other cases the Justices 
responded with caution to some of Congress’s boldest jurisdictional 
innovations, reading the statutes to preserve established limitations 
that Congress might have intended to overturn.74 All in all, the 
Court’s record in the post-bellum years was hardly uniform in one 
direction or the other.75 In any event, the Court’s response to the 
jurisdictional statutes of the 1860s and 1870s does at least belie any 
notion that narrow construction is a long-standing, deeply rooted 
policy of the law. 
As further evidence that the modern idea of strict construction 
of federal jurisdiction is a relatively late arrival, consider G.A. 
Endlich’s 1880s American revision of Maxwell’s famous British 
treatise on statutory interpretation. Drawing on Maxwell’s teachings 
but adding support from American (mostly state) jurisprudence, 
Endlich initially recites both the presumption against ousting existing 
jurisdiction and the presumption against creating new jurisdiction.76 
Coming then to the particularly American problem of federal courts, 
Endlich writes: 
The presumption against the extension, or creation of new jurisdictions is one of 
considerable practical importance as affecting the powers of federal courts. The federal 
courts have, strictly speaking, no common law jurisdiction; and as their jurisdiction is 
special and not general, there can be no presumption of jurisdiction in their favor and 
the record must disclose all the facts necessary to give them cognizance of the case 
under the various acts of Congress. In the construction of these acts, however, a 
reasonable liberality is not to be denied to their language.77 
Endlich was unusual in directly addressing the issue of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Other nineteenth-century treatises on 
statutory interpretation focused on state courts and general 
principles, often reciting an unhelpful mix of canons—for example, 
that statutes creating jurisdictions not recognized at common law are 
strictly construed, except when they are not, such as when the 
 
 74.  In the 1873 Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, the Supreme Court did not cite a 
narrow-construction rule, but the Court did say that it should not read the recent removal 
statutes to override long-standing restrictions on removal unless their language unmistakably so 
required. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 584–87 (1873); see also KUTLER, supra note 68, at 153–54 
(arguing that the Court failed to honor congressional intent in that case). 
 75.  See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 87–147 (1992) (describing the Court’s 
shifting approaches to diversity jurisdiction and diversity removal cases). 
 76.  G.A. ENDLICH, COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 211, 217–19, 488, 
736 (Jersey City, N.J., Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1888).  
 77.  Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added). 
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statutes are deemed remedial.78 Treatises on federal jurisdiction from 
the early 1880s do not state a rule of strict construction.79 
All of this leaves us with this surprising finding: almost one 
hundred years into the life of the federal courts, there was no canon of 
strictly construing federal jurisdiction or, at least, nothing resembling 
the well-established and oft-repeated canon we see today. 
Things would soon begin to change, however, both in the courts 
and in Congress. Traces of the modern narrow-construction rule began 
to appear in lower-court opinions in the 1880s. The statutes of the 
1860s and 1870s had led to massively swollen federal dockets,80 and 
some federal judges began to react against generous grants of 
jurisdiction. In one 1885 case, Judge Brewer, who would later be 
appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote: 
[I]t must be remembered that in questions of doubt as to jurisdiction, the federal courts 
should remand. They should not be covetous, but miserly, of jurisdiction. . . . The 
overburdened docket of this court should not be loaded with removed cases, unless its 
jurisdiction is clear and the mandates of the law imperatively require it.81  
In 1887, Congress enacted important legislation that cut back on 
jurisdiction, especially removal jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, a 
leading authority of the day explained the change in congressional 
policy reflected in that statute and how the courts responded to it: 
The history of the Federal jurisdiction is one of constant growth; slow, indeed, during 
the first half-century and more, but very rapid within the last few years. . . . But a 
strong reactionary tendency has been manifested in the latest enactment of Congress 
upon this subject, [namely the 1887 statute.] . . . Its apparent design is to stem the tide 
of litigation pouring into the Federal courts . . . . In fact the courts hold that the 
intention of the act to restrict the removal of causes is so clear that it must be strictly 
construed against anyone seeking to evade the additional requirements which it puts 
upon the right of removal.82 
 
 78.  See BISHOP, supra note 48, at 190–91. The treatise writer most remembered today, 
because his treatise lives on in modern editions, is Sutherland. His 1891 first edition included 
several sections that present historically familiar canons applicable to jurisdictional statutes, 
including a presumption against ouster of established jurisdictions and a rule that limited 
jurisdictions should be construed strictly, but it did not address federal courts in particular. 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 48, §§ 421, 504–07, 561. Another treatise from the same era also 
repeats these familiar twin presumptions, but it likewise does not have anything to say about 
federal courts in particular. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 123–24 (St. Paul, W. Publ’g Co. 1896). 
 79.  GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883); WILLIAM E. MILLER & 
GEORGE W. FIELD, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Des Moines, Mills & Co. 1881). 
 80.  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 68, at 60–65, 77–78, 86–87. 
 81.  Kansas v. Bradley, 26 F. 289, 292 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885). 
 82.  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK & JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS 
TO FEDERAL COURTS 2–4 (St. Louis, Cent. Law Journal Co. 5th ed. 1889) (emphasis omitted); see 
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Another treatise, written at the turn of the century, observed that 
some older cases, presumably those interpreting the 1860s and 1875 
statutes, had stated or implied that removal provisions should be 
liberally construed. “But,” the treatise cautioned, “that is not the 
present practice”; instead, “[removal] statutes should be strictly 
construed.”83 In the waning years of the nineteenth century and the 
early years of the twentieth, one can find quite a number of 
statements in lower-court cases referring to a purportedly well-
established practice of construing the removal statutes narrowly.84  
The authorities just cited focused on removal jurisdiction, in 
some cases referring to the congressional policies behind the 1887 Act 
in particular, and these cases are not much cited today as sources for 
the narrow-construction canon in its more general form. For the 
source of the modern rule, which has been understood to apply to 
jurisdictional statutes generally, one must look a bit later. When one 
examines today’s lower-court invocations of the canon and traces the 
line of authority back through the sedimented layers of circuit 
precedent, one usually ends up with one of two Supreme Court cases: 
Healy v. Ratta (1934)85 or Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets 
(1941).86 Healy addressed the issue of how to measure the amount in 
controversy in a dispute over a license fee. If the relevant amount was 
the small fee immediately due, the jurisdictional amount was not 
satisfied; if the proper amount was the reduction in the value of the 
 
also Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 462 (1894) (referring to the 1887 Act’s 
“general policy” of “contract[ing]” jurisdiction).  
 83.  B.C. MOON, THE REMOVAL OF CAUSES 47, 48 n.5 (1901). From reading the relevant 
sections of Moon’s treatise, it is plain that he was a booster of the narrow-construction canon, not 
just a dispassionate reporter. Given the concrete stakes involved in forum choice, it is not 
surprising to see, then or now, that observation and prescription can blend. 
 84.  E.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 201 F. 932, 945 (E.D. Tenn. 1912) 
(referring to a “well-settled rule” of remanding when jurisdiction is unclear); Heller v. Ilwaco Mill 
& Lumber Co., 178 F. 111, 112 (C.C.D. Or. 1910) (referring to a “tendency . . . to construe [the 
1887 act] strictly against the right of removal”); Shane v. Butte Elec. Ry. Co., 150 F. 801, 812 
(C.C.D. Mont. 1906) (stating that “the federal courts have recognized that the statutes of removal 
should be construed not in a way to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction where the question is 
doubtful”); Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 132 F. 713, 713 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (remanding 
where authorities were split regarding whether the amount sought in a counterclaim could be 
added to the plaintiff’s claim in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount and stating that “where 
a substantial doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of the federal court the case should be 
remanded”); Dwyer v. Peshall, 32 F. 497 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (“The amendments of 1887 were 
plainly meant to restrict removals from state to federal courts. . . . The intention of the act is so 
clear that it should be strictly construed against any one seeking to evade the additional 
limitations which it puts upon the right of removal.”); see also Haiber, supra note 27, at 624 
(identifying judicial interpretations of the 1887 statute as the source of the rule of strictly 
construing removal).  
 85.  292 U.S. 263 (1934).   
 86.  313 U.S. 100 (1941).  
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business caused by the licensing requirement, the jurisdictional 
amount would be met.87 The Court ruled that the former measure was 
proper and ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.88 In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court stated: 
Not only does the language of the statute point to this conclusion, but the policy clearly 
indicated by the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts 
supports it. . . . [T]he jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by 
successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased the jurisdictional 
amount. The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction. . . . Due regard for the 
rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, 
requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which 
the statute has defined.89 
The other frequently cited source for the canon, especially as 
regards removal jurisdiction, is Shamrock Oil & Gas. That case 
addressed whether a plaintiff who had filed in state court could 
remove to federal court when faced with a counterclaim that satisfied 
the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.90 The Supreme Court ruled 
that the plaintiff could not remove. The Court reasoned that the then-
current removal statute restricted removal to “the defendant or 
defendants” and that this language was narrower, and was intended 
by Congress to be narrower, than the prior version of the statute, 
which had referred to “either party.”91 The Court then added: “Not 
only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional 
purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, 
but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the 
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of 
such legislation.”92 One might observe that here, as in Healy, the 
reference to an interpretive presumption came after the Court had 
already mentioned other factors that pointed in the same direction; 
the presumption was, therefore, arguably unnecessary to the result.93 
Such are the relative trickles of authority that eventually became the 
daily flood of support, in lower-court citations, for the general rule of 
narrow construction. 
 
 87.  292 U.S. at 265–66. 
 88.  Id. at 272. 
 89.  Id. at 269–70 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 90.  313 U.S. at 102–03. 
 91.  Id. at 104–08. 
 92.  Id. at 108. The Court concluded this paragraph with a quotation and citation to Healy. 
Id. at 109. 
 93.  More broadly, one could argue that interpretive rules are never necessary, that they 
are always dicta. The precedential status of the canons is addressed below. See infra Section 
II.A.2. 
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b. The Supreme Court’s Recent Neglect and Negativity 
Recent history has not been kind to the jurisdiction canon. 
Endorsements of the canon at the Supreme Court level have become 
rare.94 More common is neglect. In one 1999 case, which interpreted 
the timing requirements for removal, one of the main points of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s brief dissent was to accuse the majority of 
“depart[ing] from this Court’s practice of strictly construing removal 
and similar jurisdictional statutes.”95 One might have expected the 
majority to respond, perhaps by explaining that the canon had been 
overcome by other considerations, but the majority did not mention 
the canon at all.96 To be sure, any particular omission of the canon can 
be deemed insignificant. Yet, as the following paragraphs explain, the 
Supreme Court’s cases show a pattern of negative treatment that is 
hard to ignore. 
When the modern Court does mention the jurisdiction canon, 
what it says is often ambivalent or even hostile. In 2003, the Court 
cited Shamrock Oil & Gas and referred (at least in paraphrasing a 
party’s argument) to a “federal policy of construing removal 
jurisdiction narrowly.”97 The Court nonetheless went on to hold that 
there was removal jurisdiction and—in a passage that looks 
portentous in retrospect—questioned the validity of the narrow-
construction rule, at least in certain types of removal disputes, in light 
of post-1941 amendments to the removal statute.98 Read for all it is 
worth, this passage could be taken to mean that narrow construction 
of jurisdiction is not a general policy of the law but merely a function 
of the legislative goals behind certain jurisdictional enactments, which 
of course Congress can and does change from time to time. 
Since then, the Court has gone further to marginalize—and 
arguably abrogate—the canon. In 2005, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Services, Inc., the Court had what is probably its most 
 
 94.  For one of those rare invocations of the canon, see Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. 
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (stating that “statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly 
construed” and citing four cases from the 1920s through 1940s). 
 95.  Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 357 (1999) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
 96.  The Court’s rather short opinion relied largely on traditional practice and pragmatic 
considerations. See 526 U.S. at 351–56.  
 97.  Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003) (citing Shamrock Oil 
& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)). 
 98.  Breuer, 538 U.S. at 697–98. In 1948, after Shamrock Oil & Gas, the removal statute 
was amended to provide that suits within the district courts’ original jurisdiction were removable 
“[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,” (emphasis added), which the Court 
in Breuer understood to put the burden on the party resisting removal to identify such an 
express exception to the general rule of removability. See id. 
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important encounter with the canon in a non-removal case this 
century.99 Both of the courts of appeals in the consolidated cases under 
review in Exxon Mobil had cited the narrow-construction rule in their 
opinions.100 And in the briefing to the Supreme Court, the parties 
opposing jurisdiction used the narrow-construction canon in their 
arguments.101 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in both cases 
and, more importantly, set out the interpretive principles in the 
following way: 
We must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text 
warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is 
narrower than what the text provides. No sound canon of interpretation requires 
Congress to speak with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal 
jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordinary principles of statutory 
construction apply.102 
Especially in light of the way the case was briefed, the Court’s 
admonition to use “ordinary principles” of interpretation sounds like a 
retreat from the narrow-construction canon.103 The passage above 
could even be taken as an abrogation of the canon: courts should use 
“ordinary principles,” with no presumptions or tie-breakers against 
jurisdiction. 
John Roberts joined the Court as Chief Justice shortly after the 
Exxon Mobil decision, and since then support for the jurisdiction 
canon has further weakened. The first opinion written by the newly 
appointed Chief Justice, which concerned the standard for awarding 
fees for improper removal, gave no hint that removal was a disfavored, 
strictly construed device; if anything, the opinion’s repeated 
invocations of the defendant’s congressionally conferred “right to 
remove” suggested the contrary.104 This is not to say that the Roberts 
 
 99.  545 U.S. 546 (2005).  
 100.  Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 142 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The 
Supreme Court . . . has repeatedly admonished that in light of the burgeoning federal caseload, 
diversity jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.”), rev’d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 
757 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (urging the 
Supreme Court “to give guidance in applying the ‘substantive’ canons of statutory 
construction . . . includ[ing] the directive to construe jurisdictional grants narrowly”). 
 101.  Brief of Petitioner at 12, Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) 
(No. 04-70), 2004 WL 2812088; Brief for Respondent at 36, Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (No. 04-79), 2005 WL 139840. 
 102.  545 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 103.  I am not the only one to read the passage this way. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory 
Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 86 (2007) 
(“Although some prior Court decisions had expressed favor for interpreting jurisdictional 
statutes narrowly, Allapattah opined that jurisdictional statutes should presumptively be read 
neither broadly nor narrowly.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 104.  Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137, 140 (2005). 
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Court consistently rules in favor of expanded federal jurisdiction. 
Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not. Here we are considering not 
the outcomes of particular cases (i.e., jurisdiction exists or not) but 
rather whether the Court’s reasoning shows that the narrow-
construction canon is a vital tool. For the most part, the Court’s 
reasoning does not use and endorse the canon. One could discuss 
many examples of cases in which the canon might have been cited but 
was not, but I will describe two cases—cases that contain the Roberts 
Court’s most considered statements about the canon. One is highly 
negative on the canon and the other is at best equivocal. 
The Court’s most unfavorable statement came in the December 
2014 decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens.105 In 
that case, the Court rejected use of the jurisdiction canon in cases 
involving CAFA and cast doubt on the canon’s validity as a more 
general matter. Dart Cherokee involved a routine matter of removal 
practice, namely whether a notice of removal had to be accompanied 
by evidence (not just allegations) establishing the existence of 
necessary jurisdictional facts. The Court easily answered in the 
negative: the notice of removal only need include sufficient allegations; 
evidence might be required only later, if the allegations were 
challenged. Given the fairly obvious error in the lower court’s 
understanding of removal requirements,106 it was probably 
unnecessary for the Court to address the role of background policies 
and presumptions. But the Court did: 
[The lower court] relied, in part, on a purported “presumption” against removal. We 
need not here decide whether such a presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases. 
It suffices to point out that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, 
which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal 
court.107 
To drive the point home, the Court then cited a portion of CAFA’s 
legislative history stating that the statute’s “provisions should be read 
broadly”108—i.e., contrary to the traditional canon. 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the jurisdiction canon’s use in 
CAFA cases was contrary to the understandings of lower courts, which 
had mostly applied the canon to CAFA cases,109 but for our purposes 
that is not the most important aspect of the decision. The more 
 
 105.  135 S. Ct. 547 (2014). 
 106.  Although the Court divided 5-4 in Dart Cherokee, the dissenters did not endorse the 
lower court’s interpretation of the removal statute. Rather, they contended that the Supreme 
Court could not properly reach the issue at all. Id. at 558–59, 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107.  Id. at 554 (majority opinion). 
 108.  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), quoted in Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554. 
 109.  See infra note 242 and accompanying text.  
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significant thing is that the Court took the quite unnecessary step of 
referring to the presumption against removal in its more general 
form—despite the presumption’s prior endorsement by the Supreme 
Court and thousands of citations in the lower courts—as merely a 
“purported” rule! That sort of dismissive treatment is a bad omen for 
the jurisdiction canon, especially when it follows a decade of rude 
neglect. 
In my estimation, the closest the Roberts Court has come to 
expressing the narrow-construction rule is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, which concerned the interpretation 
of a jurisdictional provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.110 
The Act provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over suits “brought to 
enforce any liability or duty” created by the Act. The question in 
Merrill Lynch was whether that jurisdictional grant applied when a 
plaintiff alleged violations of the Act’s duties but sought relief only on 
state-law theories. The Court held that there was no federal 
jurisdiction, reasoning that the Act’s jurisdictional provision did not go 
beyond 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s general grant of jurisdiction over claims 
that “arise under” federal law, a jurisdictional grant that the parties 
agreed did not encompass the plaintiff’s claim.111 Near the end of its 
opinion, after discussing the Act’s text and the relevant precedents 
interpreting it and similarly worded statutes, the Court turned to 
considerations of policy. The opinion stated that “this Court has time 
and again declined to construe federal jurisdictional statutes more 
expansively than their language, most fairly read, requires”112 and 
observed that the Court had been reluctant to “expand the jurisdiction 
of federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes.”113 
This language clearly rejects any rule of broad/liberal interpretation, 
but it stops short of embracing the traditional rule of narrow/strict 
interpretation. To be sure, the difference between narrow, normal, and 
broad interpretation is elusive in practice.114 But the Court’s use of 
different wording was almost certainly not accidental. The passage at 
issue quoted language from Healy and Shamrock Oil & Gas about the 
need to give due regard to the role of state courts,115 but it did not 
quote those cases’ much-cited and canon-generative adjacent language 
 
 110.  136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016). 
 111.  Id. at 1567, 1575. 
 112.  Id. at 1573. 
 113.  Id. (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)).  
 114.  See supra Section I.B. 
 115.  136 S. Ct. at 1573. 
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that refers to “strict construction.”116 Further, the lower court under 
review in Merrill Lynch had used the traditional language of strict 
construction.117 
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward the canon over roughly 
the last decade, which has ranged from neglect to ambivalence to 
hostility, has not yet made much of an impression on the lower courts 
in non-CAFA cases.118 As observed at the outset, they cite the canon 
hundreds of times every year.119 This divergence between the practices 
of courts at the different levels of the judicial hierarchy is a point to 
which we will return later, in the descriptive assessment of the 
canon’s trajectory.120 
2. Precedential Analysis 
Armed with an understanding of the jurisdiction canon’s 
history, we can consider whether the jurisdiction canon is justified as 
a matter of precedent. As the history revealed, the jurisdiction canon’s 
pedigree is a bit weaker and more contingent than one might guess 
given the frequency with which lower courts now cite it. Of course, our 
modern notion of precedent does not require much to make law. If the 
Supreme Court says something once, that statement becomes the law 
of the land until overruled, at least as far as lower courts are 
concerned.121 One published opinion by a court of appeals generally 
 
 116.  See supra text accompanying notes 85–93 (discussing these cases’ roles as sources for 
the jurisdiction canon). The same paragraph of Merrill Lynch also quoted Romero, but again not 
Romero’s own quotation, two sentences before, of Healy’s “strict construction” language.   
 117.  Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 
2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1562. 
 118.  See 16 GEORGENE VAIRO, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.05 (3d ed. 2016) 
(“Recent developments have cast some doubt on the axioms that removal is strictly construed 
and that a presumption exists against removal . . . . Nevertheless, federal courts continue to 
recite these axioms [i.e., of narrow construction].”); Bruhl, supra note 18, at 532–33 (noting that 
lower courts largely ignored the Supreme Court’s negative statements about the canon in Exxon 
Mobil). For an example of a rare lower-court opinion that saw Exxon Mobil as diminishing the 
canon, see Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d. 327, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2008) (Niemeyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 119.  Supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 120.  See infra Sections III.A–B. A forthcoming study by Anita Krishnakumar shows that the 
Supreme Court uses substantive canons less often than most of us would have guessed. Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). As 
this Article illustrates, courts at different levels of the judicial system can show quite different 
frequencies of use for different canons. The jurisdiction canon is heavily used in the lower courts 
but plays a smaller role in the Supreme Court. Other canons show the opposite pattern. See 
Bruhl, supra note 18, at 554–55. 
 121.  See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (referring to “[t]he modern 
concept of binding precedent—where a single opinion sets the course on a particular point of law 
and must be followed by courts at the same level and lower within a pyramidal judicial 
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makes law for the district courts in that circuit and the court of 
appeals itself unless the en banc court overrules it.122 Further, stare 
decisis is said to protect statutory-interpretative precedents with even 
greater than usual force, because, unlike constitutional precedents, 
they can be corrected by Congress.123 
Nonetheless, a precedent-based defense of the jurisdiction 
canon is subject to two important counterarguments. The first 
counterargument holds that a canon, and interpretive methodology 
more generally, is not the sort of thing that can enjoy precedential 
effect as a formal matter. The second counterargument assumes that 
the jurisdiction canon could have precedential force (either formally or 
in the looser sense that settled practices presumptively ought to be 
honored) but nonetheless holds that the canon does not deserve much 
protection because abrogating it would neither upset private reliance 
interests, nor frustrate congressional expectations, nor unsettle the 
judicial system. The following Subsections elaborate on these points 
and conclude that history and precedent can provide at best modest 
support for the canon. 
a. Canons as Precedents 
Suppose a court rules in a case (call it case C) that a particular 
jurisdictional statute S does not provide jurisdiction over a certain 
dispute D. Along the way to that outcome, the court cites several 
considerations in support of its interpretation of the jurisdictional 
statute, including the jurisdiction canon. “Our reading of the statute’s 
text is reinforced and confirmed,” we could imagine the court writing, 
“by the rule that statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction are to 
be narrowly construed.” 
Which aspects of case C enjoy precedential effect? Surely such 
effect attaches at least to the result that statute S does not confer 
jurisdiction over dispute D and the category of disputes that are 
indistinguishable from D. (Whether a particular dispute fits within 
that category may well be debatable, of course, but that is always part 
of the ordinary process of applying and distinguishing precedent.) 
 
hierarchy”); see also Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683–84 (1986) 
(“In interpretive arenas below the Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is 
worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.”). 
 122.  Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 
787, 794–804 (2012); see also John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An 
Endangered or Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 125–29 (2006) (discussing the 
development of today’s strict “peremptory” law of the circuit). 
 123.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2403 (2015). 
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Whether other aspects of case C, such as the narrow-construction 
canon, have precedential status is far less clear. 
One initial complication is that the canon was presented, in the 
hypothetical above, as one aspect of the rationale supporting the 
outcome, but the canon was not the only consideration. In this respect 
the hypothetical is realistic, as any single interpretive source is 
usually just one part of the justification for a result.124 Indeed, the 
leading Supreme Court invocations of the jurisdiction canon could 
reasonably be characterized as cases in which use of the canon was 
unnecessary (though this did not stop those cases from being widely 
cited as sources for the canon).125 
There is a second, deeper problem. Suppose the hypothetical 
were modified so that the canon represented the decisive reason for 
the outcome in case C. Even so, it is not at all clear that the canon 
would therefore achieve precedential status for all disputes involving 
jurisdictional statutes or even all disputes arising under statute S. 
That is because interpretive methodology presents a difficult and 
disputed question about the proper “scope” of precedent.126 In part the 
uncertainty can be laid at the feet of the age-old dispute over how 
broadly to define a case’s holding and how much of the court’s 
reasoning becomes transferable binding law as opposed to non-binding 
dicta. But the canons of interpretation arguably present a special case 
within that debate. Indeed, the question of interpretive methodology’s 
legal status has attracted enough scholarly attention of late to form its 
own subcategory of jurisprudential inquiry.127 Although the normative 
question of how methodology should be treated is a complex one, there 
is something approaching a conventional wisdom within the field of 
legislation that questions of methodology generally do not, as a 
descriptive matter, enjoy ordinary precedential status in federal 
practice, especially not in the Supreme Court.128 
 
 124.  Even the strongest supporters of the canons recognize that canons are not rigid rules 
that, taken individually, conclusively demonstrate meaning. Rather, different canons and other 
indications of meaning need to be synthesized and reconciled through sound judgment. See 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51, 
59–62 (2012). 
 125.  See supra text accompanying notes 85–92. 
 126.  See Randy Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 222–23 (2014) 
(discussing whether matters of interpretive methodology fall within the binding portion of a prior 
decision).  
 127.  See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079 (2017); Gluck, supra note 16, at 1907–18, 1968–90; Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, 
Interpretive Freedom: A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011). 
 128.  See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872–84 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court does not give decisions about interpretive methodology ordinary binding effect); Abbe R. 
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For my own part, I believe that the precedential effect of the 
canons has generally been underestimated. I think this has happened 
for two reasons. First, an assessment of whether the canons are 
binding needs to take into account the nature of the canons as non-
conclusive contributors to meaning. This topic requires further 
development in future work,129 but let us suppose that being binding, 
for a canon, just means that the canon is a mandatory contributor to 
the resolution of an interpretive problem when the conditions for its 
applicability are satisfied.130 Second, scholars’ low estimate of the 
canons’ force is also the result of the typical focus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which is indeed cavalier about disregarding interpretive rules 
(or any other rules) when they would be inconvenient. 
When one looks to the lower courts, some glimmers of binding 
force come into view. To be sure, one rarely sees the matter of 
methodological stare decisis directly debated, because interpretive 
methodology tends to be implicit and unnoticed. Nonetheless, lower 
courts do sometimes speak as if the canons were binding on them in 
the sense that they are non-optional inputs when their triggering 
criteria are satisfied.131 That is, the courts apply the canons and give 
them weight because a higher court, or prior precedent from the same 
court, has commanded it. And this is true for the jurisdiction canon in 
particular. In a noteworthy example, a recent decision from the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit read the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dart Cherokee as establishing “binding precedent” on how to 
interpret all provisions of CAFA.132 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit 
repudiated prior circuit law that had employed the narrow-
 
Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (stating that “[m]ethodological stare 
decisis—the practice of giving precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology—is 
generally absent from the jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation”); 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385–89 (2005) (observing that “stare decisis effect attaches to the 
interpretation that the Court gives to a statute, but the Court does not adhere to the interpretive 
methods used to reach that interpretation”). 
 129.  See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, What Would It Mean to Have Methodological Precedent 
(and Do We Already Have It)? (Dec. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 130.  I realize that referring to a canon’s conditions of applicability elides some tough 
questions. For any given canon, it might not be clear—or indeed, it might be hotly contested—
whether the canon must always be considered at the start of the analysis, whether the canon 
takes precedence over some other source like legislative history, etc. This sort of dispute does not 
mean the canon is not a mandatory contributor, just that its triggering conditions are unclear or 
unsettled. The same can be true of substantive precedents, of course. 
 131.  See Bruhl, supra note 18, at 489 n.21 (providing examples from various contexts). 
 132.  Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Applying this binding 
precedent from the Supreme Court [i.e., the Dart Cherokee case], we may no longer rely on any 
presumption in favor of remand in deciding CAFA jurisdictional questions.”). 
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construction canon.133 This does not necessarily mean that specific 
jurisdictional outcomes will change, but the Eleventh Circuit is saying 
that its interpretive regime has changed in a non-optional way. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly 
rejected an argument that Dart Cherokee’s statement about 
interpretive presumptions was dictum; instead, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that the Supreme Court’s new “instruct[ions]” abrogated prior 
circuit law to the extent circuit law had applied the narrow-
construction canon to CAFA cases.134 
The lower courts’ tendency to treat the canons as binding even 
if they are arguably dicta in a technical sense should not really 
surprise us. Despite the traditional importance of the holding-dicta 
distinction, today’s lower courts make little use of it.135 They tend, 
instead, to look to the Supreme Court as a source of broadly applicable 
rules to be followed, not a source of narrow holdings to be 
distinguished.136 
The discussion above provides some evidence of lower courts 
treating the jurisdiction canon as precedential—evidence that tends to 
undermine the conventional view that canons lack such status—but 
the brief treatment here is not meant to be definitive. The discussion 
does not attempt to establish that the courts would be correct, as a 
matter of first principles, to give methodology such effect. Whether 
they should do so is, as noted already, a complex and controversial 
question. But for the sake of further argument, we can assume that 
the jurisdiction canon does and should enjoy precedential status under 
the doctrine of stare decisis (not just as a matter of traditionalist 
respect for settled practices). That is, lower courts are absolutely 
bound by the Supreme Court’s rulings about the canon and the Court 
itself must give them presumptively binding effect. As the next 
Sections show, even these assumptions are probably not sufficient to 
justify the canon’s perpetuation. 
b. Reliance 
Whether the jurisdiction canon has formal precedential status 
is not determinative of the question whether history justifies the 
 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1182–84 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 135.  David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court 
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025–26, 2032–42 (2013); Judith M. Stinson, 
Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 240 (2010). 
 136.  Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
595 (2017). 
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canon. Stare decisis is not absolute even in the statutory context.137 In 
determining whether to reject prior law, one crucial factor—probably 
the most important factor—is whether there has been reliance on the 
prior law.138 That is, the court being asked to overrule precedent asks 
whether private parties or institutions of government have made 
decisions premised on a certain state of the law and whether upsetting 
those expectations would lead to unfairness or disutility. Indeed, as a 
more general matter, any institution that is considering changing the 
law, even in the absence of a formal doctrine of precedent, should 
consider the effects of historically based expectations. (Legislatures 
are not bound by stare decisis, but that does not mean they should 
alter the law willy-nilly.) Therefore, whether or not one gives formal 
precedential status to canons, we should consider matters such as 
private reliance interests (explored in this Section), as well as 
congressional expectations (taken up afterward, in Section II.A.2.c) 
and judicial reliance (Section II.A.2.d). 
Private reliance interests provide at most meager support for 
retaining the jurisdiction canon. The situations that trigger the most 
powerful reliance interests are typically situations in which parties 
make investments and otherwise order their affairs based on the 
existence of substantive entitlements, such as the various rights that 
come along with contractual relations or the ownership of property.139 
Matters of procedure and evidence are usually different. To choose an 
extreme example, people typically do not arrange their primary 
conduct (buying houses, changing jobs, etc.) based on such things as 
whether, in a hypothetical future lawsuit, the trial judge would be 
allowed to tell the jury of his or her view of the weight of the evidence. 
The matter of which court, state versus federal, might resolve a 
potential future dispute is more important than that last example, but 
there are a number of ways in which our system flattens differences 
across courts and thereby suppresses the influence of forum 
availability on primary conduct.140 And here we are a further step 
 
 137.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). 
 138.  See generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013) 
(examining the role of reliance arguments in the doctrine of stare decisis); Hillel Y. Levin, A 
Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035 (2013) (same). 
 139.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis 
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.”). 
 140.  For example, the Erie doctrine means that the substantive law applied in federal and 
state court will generally be the same, at least in principle. Similarly, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure means that the federal courts will typically exercise the same 
personal jurisdiction as the state courts, so that access to federal court does not expand the 
number of states in which suit could be brought. 
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removed from serious reliance interests because we are not dealing 
with the fate of particular established jurisdictional propositions (e.g., 
disputes of type D must be heard in state court) but instead with an 
interpretive rule that might have some effect on the resolution of 
unsettled jurisdictional questions. 
We can find some illumination on these points in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan,141 which overruled a prior 
decision about the manner in which courts were supposed to analyze 
government officials’ assertions of the defense of qualified immunity in 
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prior law had imposed a sequencing 
requirement according to which courts were required first to address 
whether the defendant had violated the law and, if so, whether the 
law had been so clearly established at the time of the defendant’s 
conduct that any reasonable officer would have recognized the 
illegality.142 In overruling that requirement, the Court emphasized 
that the sequencing requirement was a form of procedural rule that 
did not engender serious reliance interests.143 Moreover, in response to 
the argument that change could be left to Congress, the Court 
explained that the sequencing requirement was a judge-made rule 
regarding how courts go about making decisions, such that the 
judiciary was actually the most appropriate initiator of change.144 In 
light of those factors, the Court dispensed with the usual need to find 
egregious error or unworkability before overruling precedent.145 
The reasoning of Pearson is applicable by analogy here. 
Although the jurisdiction canon involves statutory interpretation, it 
involves judicial methodology (i.e., procedure). And although one could 
claim that the canon, like most established canons, has won 
congressional blessing through acquiescence, interpretive canons are 
typically not the sort of thing that Congress expressly regulates and 
repudiates.146 
In sum, even if the jurisdiction canon is theoretically eligible 
for precedential effect, it would be vulnerable to overruling because it 
does not engender the sorts of reliance interests that provide the 
strongest support for following precedent. 
 
 141.  555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 142.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 
 143.  555 U.S. at 234. 
 144.  Id. at 242. 
 145.  See id. at 234. 
 146.  Cf. Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing that Congress should take a more active role in governing the 
interpretive regime). 
2-Bruhl_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:54 PM 
532 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:499 
I should close this Section by noting an important assumption 
upon which it is based. The discussion of reliance has been assuming 
that settled interpretations of jurisdictional statutes—the diversity 
statute requires complete diversity, limited liability companies are 
treated like partnerships rather than corporations for diversity 
purposes, etc.—will remain in place even if the jurisdiction canon is 
abandoned. To be sure, that is not the only way to carry out a shift in 
methodology: one could instead treat all prior outcomes as up for 
grabs, to be considered afresh in light of the new interpretive 
approach. Such an approach would threaten extreme disruption. My 
assumption that courts would honor previous interpretations comports 
with the way the U.S. Supreme Court has usually behaved, namely by 
preserving prior holdings even when they are out of step, as a matter 
of interpretive methodology, with current approaches. “Principles of 
stare decisis,” the Court has written, “demand respect for precedent 
whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the 
same.”147 In the related context of private rights of action, the 
Supreme Court’s approach has seriously changed from one in which 
the Court freely created causes of action where necessary to achieve 
Congress’s regulatory objectives to one in which the Court focuses on 
whether the statutory text demonstrates that Congress itself created 
such a remedy.148 Yet the Court generally has not gone back and 
overruled the prior cases that created such remedies, though some 
members of the Court would read those prior cases narrowly so as not 
to further expand the relief available.149 
A side effect of leaving existing interpretations in place is that 
the jurisdiction canon, even if abolished, could continue to exercise 
influence from beyond the grave. Courts try to make new enactments 
(and new interpretations of old enactments) cohere with the existing 
body of law.150 To the extent that the existing body of (non-CAFA) 
precedents reflects a history of reading jurisdiction narrowly, 
coherence-based interpretation and reasoning by analogy would tend 
to push new interpretations in that same direction, canon or no. 
 
 147.  CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); see also John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (refusing to overrule precedent that was 
out of step with newer presumption about how to interpret limitations periods for claims against 
the government). 
 148.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (describing the change in 
approach). 
 149.  See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77–78 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 150.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1569–71 (2010) (describing the ubiquity of the “integrative” mode 
of interpretation). 
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c. Congressional Expectations 
Even if private parties are unlikely to have serious investment-
backed expectations in a rule about how to interpret jurisdictional 
statutes, other actors or institutions might have relied on the canon in 
ways worth protecting. One entity that might have an interest in the 
continued use of the jurisdiction canon is Congress.151 
Prior interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes provide the 
status quo baseline against which Congress legislates.152 Changing the 
existing interpretations that Congress takes for granted when it 
legislates could render some of its handiwork superfluous or even 
counterproductive. But, again, the relevant question here is instead 
whether Congress relies on existing interpretive methodologies and 
canons, not existing interpretations, when it drafts legislation. 
It is conceivable that Congress relies on canons in ways that 
are worth respecting. Indeed, one potential strategy for justifying the 
canons is to cast them as a coordinating regime that provides 
background rules against which Congress can legislate with some 
confidence about how courts will fill gaps and resolve ambiguities.153 If 
Congress knows, for example, that statutory uncertainties will be read 
in favor of criminal defendants, against preemption of state law, 
against extraterritorial effect, and against federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction, then it should legislate with particular clarity when it 
wishes to impose criminal liability, preempt state law, legislate 
extraterritorially, or expand subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The Congress-centered justification for the jurisdiction canon is 
subject to several objections. Perhaps the most obvious objection is 
that the coordination-related benefits of an interpretive regime cannot 
materialize if the canons are applied too erratically to generate a 
stable set of background expectations against which Congress can act. 
Further, even if courts are reliable enough in their use of the 
jurisdiction canon (which they may well be, compared to the way they 
use other canons), the justificatory strategy requires that Congress 
consider the jurisdiction canon when it legislates. On this matter the 
evidence is mixed. A recent study by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
 
 151.  See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 
454 (2010) (“Like private citizens, our legislative and executive branches of government rely on 
the Supreme Court’s rulings as setting the rules of the road.”). 
 152.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 6–18 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 
580 (providing extensive discussion of existing interpretations of jurisdictional and venue 
statutes as part of the justification for why certain amendments were desirable). 
 153.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 65–67 (1994) (discussing this potential coordinating benefit of an interpretive 
regime). 
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Bressman demonstrated that congressional drafters have at best 
uneven awareness of many aspects of judicial interpretive practice,154 
though, to be clear, the Gluck and Bressman study did not ask the 
survey participants about the jurisdiction canon in particular. At the 
same time, although the jurisdiction canon is not as famous as some 
canons, there is some evidence that Congress knows about the canon. 
Congress has mentioned it in committee reports155—and one could 
read the CAFA legislative history as attempting a partial abrogation 
of it.156 Those signs of awareness might not be flukes; the Judiciary 
Committees and their staffs tend to include even more lawyers than 
average, and it would be reasonable to suspect that those committees 
think about judicial interpretive approaches more than most.157 So it 
is at least conceivable that Congress does rely upon the canon and 
may have some expectations thwarted if the courts reject it. At the 
same time, CAFA and other recent legislative efforts show that today’s 
Congress might prefer a more expansive approach to jurisdictional 
statutes.158 It is not obvious which should carry more weight for the 
modern interpreter: a possible congressional assumption that courts 
engage in narrow interpretation or an apparent current congressional 
preference for broad interpretation.159 
It is also possible that Congress has indirectly relied on the 
jurisdiction canon’s presumed tendency to restrict federal dockets in 
 
 154.  See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 906–07, 926–29 (2013); see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of 
Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (showing that 
legislative decisionmaking is driven more by the need to achieve agreement than by the goal of 
ensuring optimal judicial interpretation). 
 155.  E.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29 (“It is a 
canon of construction that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction.”). The dissenting views 
accompanying the House Judiciary Committee report in favor of the proposed Fraudulent 
Joinder Prevention Act of 2016 invoked the canon numerous times in arguing that the bill’s 
expansion of jurisdiction was contrary to principles of federalism. H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 19, 
21, 26 (2016). 
 156.  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005) (stating that CAFA’s provisions “should be read 
broadly”). 
 157.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 725, 752–53, 755, 792 (2014) (finding mixed support for greater emphasis on canons on the 
Judiciary Committee); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 154, at 581–82 (“Of all committees, [the 
Senate Judiciary Committee] is the one where staffers are most likely to be schooled in the rules 
of clarity, canons of construction, and statutory interpretation.”). 
 158.  See supra Section II.C (discussing congressional preferences regarding the scope of 
jurisdiction). 
 159.  Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2027, 2084 (2002) (arguing that ambiguities should be interpreted to satisfy the discernible 
preference of the current government rather than those from the time of enactment). 
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making decisions about the size and staffing of the federal judiciary. 
Potential docket impacts of altering the canon are taken up below.160 
d. Judicial Familiarity 
Whether or not a canon can enjoy stare decisis effect as a 
formal matter, and whether or not private parties or even Congress 
have relied on the canon in the strict sense, it is nonetheless worth 
considering that the judiciary itself has become familiar with the 
canon and highly accustomed to using it. The canon is cited in judicial 
opinions hundreds of times a year.161 If the canon were abolished, 
judges would have to learn the new rule and break their old habit. 
Lawyers would need to adjust, and treatises would need to be 
updated. Some mistakes would occur, at least in the short term, until 
the new rule became the new habit. 
These sorts of switching costs are worth considering whenever 
legal change is proposed,162 but considered from the long-run 
perspective they are fairly minor. Most invocations of the canon in 
judicial opinions are standard boilerplate that do not involve much 
thought and often do not even directly bear on the issues before the 
court,163 so making the switch could be accomplished by updating the 
boilerplate. 
* * * 
In sum, even if the jurisdiction canon is law entitled to stare 
decisis effect—which is itself debatable—overruling it would not be 
very disruptive. It is therefore necessary to think carefully about the 
canon’s contemporary merits. The next several Sections consider 
various virtues the canon might be thought to possess. 
B. The Canon as Quasi-Constitutional Law 
Statutes that conflict with the Constitution are subject to 
invalidation, but the Constitution can also influence the interpretation 
of statutes in less drastic, but still important, ways. A general 
principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes should be read, 
whenever reasonably possible, so as to avoid interpretations that 
 
 160.  See infra Section II.E. 
 161.  See supra note 6. 
 162.  See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 
(2002) (discussing various costs that accompany legal transitions, including loss of certainty, the 
need to learn new rules, and increased risk of error). 
 163.  See infra Section III.A. 
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would present difficult constitutional questions.164 As a result, many 
canons operate as a form of “quasi-constitutional law”165 by expanding 
the effective reach of certain constitutional provisions or principles 
through presumptions that bend statutes away from the protected 
territory. This Section considers whether the jurisdiction canon can be 
understood, and justified, in this way. 
The constitutional values potentially served by the jurisdiction 
canon are respect for Article III’s limits and respect for broader 
principles of federalism. We have already observed the foundational 
character of Article III’s requirement that federal courts confine 
themselves to limited categories of cases.166 As for federalism more 
broadly, Healy v. Ratta, one of the sources of the jurisdiction canon, 
said that strict construction was appropriate in order to recognize “the 
rightful independence of state governments” and to respect the “power 
reserved to the states [under the Tenth Amendment] to provide for the 
determination of controversies in their courts.”167 Federalism is a 
constitutional value highly generative of interpretive canons, and so 
the jurisdiction canon stands alongside a number of other federalism 
canons, such as those that protect state treasuries and core state 
functions from federal interference.168 As the Supreme Court recently 
stated in Bond v. United States, “[I]t is appropriate to refer to basic 
principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve 
ambiguity in a federal statute.”169 
The constitutional considerations above provide some support 
to the jurisdiction canon, but not overly much. At least two factors 
undermine the link between constitutional values and the canon. 
First, the jurisdiction canon protects state interests of a different sort 
than the interests protected by other federalism canons. The 
jurisdiction canon does not protect state treasuries from potentially 
crippling monetary liability, as do the clear-statement rules inspired 
by the Eleventh Amendment.170 Nor does the canon protect state 
authority to regulate particular subjects through substantive law, as 
does the presumption against preemption.171 Rather, the jurisdiction 
canon concerns only adjudicative jurisdiction: the question of which 
 
 164.  See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).  
 165.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 619–29. 
 166.  See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
 167.  292 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1934) (citations and footnote omitted).  
 168.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1991). 
 169.  134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014). 
 170.  See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242–46 (1985). 
 171.  See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
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government’s courts may decide disputes that arise under substantive 
law that is either state or federal regardless of which court hears the 
case. And, of course, the existence of federal adjudicative jurisdiction 
does not even displace state adjudicative jurisdiction, as concurrent 
rather than exclusive federal jurisdiction is the normal rule.172 
Second, and more importantly, the vast majority of disputes 
about the meaning of the statutes setting forth federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction do not implicate any close questions of constitutional law. 
The constitutional balance between federal and state adjudicative 
authority is struck in Article III, which gives Congress power to confer 
federal jurisdiction within various categories of cases, and the 
jurisdictional statutes enacted pursuant to that authority are 
generally well inside the constitutional boundary. How to identify a 
corporation’s principal place of business,173 how to handle the thirty-
day deadline for removal when defendants are served at different 
times,174 how to allocate the burden of proof on factual predicates for 
removal175—all of these have been or still are important disputed 
questions under the jurisdictional statutes, but none of these 
questions generates constitutional worries in even the most anxious 
interpreter. 
A rare exception—a dispute in which the pro-jurisdiction 
reading would have raised constitutional doubts—is Mesa v. 
California.176 The case concerned whether the statute permitting 
federal officers to remove state criminal prosecutions177 requires that 
the federal officer assert a federal defense or whether status as a 
federal officer is itself sufficient to satisfy the statute. The Court 
required the assertion of a federal defense and, as part of its rationale, 
said that dispensing with that requirement would raise “serious 
doubt” about the statute’s constitutionality under Article III.178 But 
again, this makes the case unusual among jurisdictional-interpretive 
disputes. In the rare case in which the interpretation of an ambiguous 
jurisdictional statute raises a serious constitutional question, the 
 
 172.  See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–60 (1990). 
 173.  See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–96 (2010). 
 174.  See Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discussing the circuit 
conflict over this issue). The split discussed in Barbour has now been settled by amendments to 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C), which allow later-served defendants to remove the suit if they can 
persuade the earlier-served defendants who failed to timely remove to change their mind and 
join the later removal. 
 175.  See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. 409, 
411 (2008). 
 176.  489 U.S. 121 (1989). 
 177.  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012). 
 178.  489 U.S. at 136–37. 
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statute should be interpreted to avoid the questionable zone, as with 
any other kind of statute presenting constitutional doubts.179 Yet that 
hardly justifies an anti-jurisdiction canon that applies—as the 
jurisdiction canon does—to every jurisdictional question, the 
overwhelming majority of which do not remotely raise any 
constitutional difficulties. 
None of this is to say that interpretations of jurisdictional 
statutes—and allocation of judicial authority more generally—cannot 
implicate important policy debates, including some that draw their 
force from constitutionally tinged values such as judicial restraint and 
respect for state authority. Whether the jurisdiction canon is good 
policy is a separate matter taken up below.180 
C. Effectuating Congressional Preferences 
Although canons are wielded by courts, their content can 
sometimes be justified with reference to congressional intent. That is, 
for some canons at least, one can make a plausible case that they 
generally point toward the outcome that Congress would prefer.181 If 
we think that Congress typically favors veterans’ interests, then 
reading an ambiguous veterans-benefits law in a pro-veteran direction 
would help achieve the likely congressional goal.182 If we think that 
Congress probably does not wish to impose unexpected liabilities, then 
we should read statutes not to have retroactive effects when they are 
ambiguous regarding their temporal scope.183 To be clear, it is not the 
case that all substantive canons reflect, or could even be plausibly 
argued to reflect, actual congressional desires.184 Sometimes courts 
create canons that favor what they think Congress should want or, 
 
 179.  Although it is not our focus here, it is worth noting that a statute that abolishes or 
severely restricts an established jurisdiction can raise constitutional worries, on the ground that 
Congress is abridging due process or interfering with the essential function of the federal courts. 
Courts require that congressional withdrawals of jurisdiction be clearly stated, especially where 
constitutional claims are involved. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001); Miller v. 
French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, 
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000). 
 180.  See infra Section II.E (discussing potential policy justifications for the jurisdiction 
canon). 
 181.  See generally Elhauge, supra note 159 (noting many canons that could be justified in 
this way). 
 182.  See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011).  
 183.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) (“Because it accords with 
widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity 
will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations.”). 
 184.  See generally Barrett, supra note 52 (discussing the tension between judicial canons 
and congressional preferences). 
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more aggressively still, canons that stand in the way of legislative 
objectives that the courts think are unhealthy.185 But some canons at 
least plausibly advance congressional aims, and the discussion here 
considers whether the jurisdiction canon is one of those canons. 
The courts sometimes say that the canon furthers 
congressional desires. In an oft-cited passage in Healy v. Ratta, the 
Supreme Court relied on a congressional “policy” of jurisdictional 
restrictiveness in order to impose a “strict construction” on the then-
current statute setting forth the jurisdictional amount.186 Some lower 
courts today continue to state that congressional intent supports a 
rule of narrow jurisdiction.187  
To decide if the jurisdiction canon furthers congressional aims, 
we need to know what Congress wants regarding jurisdiction, which is 
not easily ascertained. Any attempt to discern congressional 
preferences on any topic runs into some familiar difficulties, such as 
the fact that Congress is a multimember body that might lack a 
cohesive intent on a question. But determining congressional intent is 
unusually difficult when it comes to jurisdiction, for legislative 
preferences are not as deeply rooted or well formed regarding 
jurisdictional matters as they are regarding substantive policy 
outcomes. Legislators tend to view jurisdiction in instrumental terms. 
To take a recurring example, when members of Congress fervently 
oppose some doctrine but cannot substantively change it because it is 
constitutional in status (like the Supreme Court decisions restricting 
school prayer or allowing abortion), they might advocate stripping the 
federal courts of jurisdiction over such cases with the hope that state 
courts will rule differently.188 But such episodes do not necessarily 
reveal any general view about the proper tie-breaker rule for close 
questions about the scope of federal jurisdiction in the ordinary run of 
cases. 
Attempts to discern congressional intent when interpreting a 
particular piece of legislation require a choice about the time at which 
 
 185.  See infra Section II.D (considering whether the jurisdiction canon can be justified on 
such grounds). 
 186.  292 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1934). 
 187.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 69 F. Supp. 3d 404, 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In fact, in light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, 
as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts 
construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.” (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 
 188.  See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 900–16 (2011) (citing examples of such efforts). 
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to assess intent,189 but in the jurisdictional context we face the timing 
difficulty in an especially acute form, for Congress revisits jurisdiction 
frequently, often with changed attitudes about its proper scope. In 
Shamrock Oil & Gas, the Court was interpreting the 1887 amendment 
to the jurisdictional statutes in which Congress did indeed hope to 
restrict jurisdiction, but the jurisdictional rules being restricted in 
1887 were those that had been created by the 1875 statute, which (like 
other statutes of that period and the preceding decade) had the goal of 
“greatly liberaliz[ing]” access to federal court.190 So the congressional 
policy revealed by jurisdictional enactments flipped in the space of a 
decade. Both of those enactments, of course, were more than a 
hundred years in the past, which leaves plenty of time for many 
subsequent shifts. 
The difficulties of discerning congressional preferences about 
jurisdiction may well suggest that congressional preferences do not 
provide the steadiest foundation for a substantive canon. Nonetheless, 
if courts are going to continue to enlist congressional desires as a 
justification for the canon, it is only current preferences that could 
provide the necessary support. The jurisdiction canon might have 
developed from the intent behind a particular nineteenth-century 
congressional enactment,191 but today the canon purports to govern a 
general category of statutes enacted and amended at various times 
(just like substantive canons governing criminal statutes, statutes 
affecting Indian tribes, statutes raising constitutional difficulties, 
federal statutes regulating matters of traditional state concern, etc.). 
If a single canon is to govern a temporally dispersed category of 
statutes, the relevant time period for measuring intent cannot be any 
particular time of enactment. If today’s canon of narrowly construing 
jurisdictional statutes is to be justified by congressional preferences, it 
would need to be today’s congressional preferences.192 
So what is Congress’s jurisdictional policy today, if there is 
one? It seems that if Congress currently has any preferences 
regarding the scope of federal adjudicatory jurisdiction, the desire is to 
expand it. Certainly that is the lesson of CAFA, the most recent major 
alteration of federal jurisdiction. CAFA was expressly intended to 
expand federal jurisdiction because state courts were regarded as 
 
 189.  See Elhauge, supra note 159, at 2081–84 (summarizing several arguments for using 
contemporary preferences rather than enacting-period preferences). 
 190.  Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941). 
 191.  See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
 192.  For the possibility that today’s general canon could fracture into separate canons 
governing different types of jurisdiction, see infra Sections II.G, III.E. 
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inappropriate fora for interstate class actions.193 In fact, the legislative 
history expressly directs courts to read CAFA’s new jurisdictional 
grant broadly, that is, contrary to the traditional canon.194 Since then, 
Congress has enacted several modest amendments to the 
jurisdictional statutes, almost entirely in an expansionary direction.195 
The House of Representatives (but not the Senate) recently passed a 
bill—the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act—that would, if enacted, 
significantly expand removal jurisdiction for diversity cases.196 The 
Act’s prospects have probably brightened due to the 2016 election 
results. 
At the same time, one should not run too far with the idea that 
Congress has a strong preference for broad jurisdiction. CAFA, the 
most powerful recent statement, was a jurisdictional statute, but it 
was enacted for very specific substantive reasons, namely (as 
discussed more fully below) to reduce the liability exposure of 
businesses.197 It was tort reform more than just jurisdictional reform, 
and for that reason it makes sense that the vote was largely along 
party lines. It is worth noting that the very next statute enacted after 
CAFA was the act creating jurisdiction and special procedural rules 
for a federal case to be brought by the parents of Terri Schiavo, the 
woman suffering in a persistent vegetative state whose sustenance 
was ordered removed by a Florida state court and whose plight 
attracted national media attention.198 Surely that statute does not tell 
us much about broader congressional views of federal jurisdiction, 
except that jurisdiction was regarded as a tool for achieving other 
ends. As those ends shift, so does jurisdictional policy. 
 
 193.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (findings and 
purpose clauses). 
 194.  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41. 
 195.  E.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a)–(c), 125 Stat. 284, 
331 (2011) (expanding original jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction in certain intellectual-
property cases); Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat 545 (expanding 
federal-officer removal); SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 3(a), 124 Stat 2380, 2381 (2010) 
(providing jurisdiction over suits involving enforcement of foreign defamation judgments). The 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 made many minor changes, 
some slightly expanding jurisdiction and others slightly curtailing it. See Arthur Hellman, The 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Is Now Law, JURIST (Dec. 20, 2011, 5:00 
PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellman-jvca.php [https://perma.cc/R339-LCT5] 
(describing the JVCA’s provisions). 
 196.  H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016); see Arthur D. Hellman, The “Fraudulent 
Joinder Prevention Act of 2016”: A New Standard and a New Rationale for an Old Doctrine, 17 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 34 (2016) (describing the bill’s provisions and purposes).  
 197.  See infra text accompanying notes 257–258. 
 198.  Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15; see Michael P. Allen, Congress 
and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 
317–21 (2005) (describing the statute). 
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All of this discussion of congressional desires leaves us, 
frankly, without much clear guidance. CAFA demonstrates that 
Congress desired to expand jurisdiction in particular ways and also to 
foster expansive interpretations of that jurisdiction, but it is hard to 
say how much the desires behind CAFA should be used to interpret 
non-CAFA jurisdictional questions. What is clearer is that there is not 
any strong, recent evidence of congressional desire in favor of the 
current canon of narrow construction, apart from the fact, the 
interpretation of which is most uncertain, that Congress has not tried 
to repeal the canon wholesale.199 If the jurisdiction canon is to be 
justified, we probably need to look elsewhere than to congressional 
desires. 
D. Counteracting Congressional Pathology 
The previous Section explained that some canons might be 
justified on the grounds that they advance congressional preferences. 
A very different, almost opposite, sort of justification is also possible: 
courts might use canons that resolve ambiguities against likely 
congressional preferences, either because providing Congress with an 
undesired result can prod it to express its preferences more clearly or, 
even more aggressively, because the courts regard Congress’s likely 
preferences as the products of a dysfunctional process.200 
A pathology-combatting justification for the jurisdiction canon 
is conceivable. Congress, one could plausibly argue, is too inclined to 
federalize things. This worry about federalization has found its 
strongest expression in the context of federal criminal law, where 
many observers have identified a problematic tendency of Congress to 
turn everything it sees into a federal case.201 One might see CAFA as a 
 
 199.  The committee report on the proposed Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016 
rejects any special presumptions against removal for cases covered by the bill, but the report 
does not take a position on whether there should be presumptions against removal in cases that 
do not implicate fraudulent joinder. H.R. REP. NO. 114–422, at 11 & n.17 (2016). The committee 
members who opposed the bill heavily relied on the canon of narrowly construing removal 
statutes, arguing that the bill conflicted with this long-standing policy. See id. at 19, 21, 26. 
 200.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162 (2002) (arguing that courts should sometimes use canons that conflict with likely 
legislative preferences in order to induce the legislature to state its preferences more clearly); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: 
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 264–66 (1986) (arguing that courts should 
favor canons that promote the broad public interest and disfavor canons that make it easier for 
Congress to benefit narrow interests). 
 201.  See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 14–17 (1998) (observing that federal criminal law expands 
because expansion is politically popular, not because the evidence shows the need for it). 
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civil-jurisdictional manifestation of the same disease.202 A judicially 
enforced canon of narrow construction would serve to resist this 
arguably unhealthy tendency. 
Under conventional premises of legislative primacy, Congress’s 
preference for federal jurisdiction would need to be highly problematic 
in order to justify such an aggressive move as establishing a canon to 
thwart it. But has Congress really gone so badly astray? As for CAFA 
in particular, it is not clear it should be regarded as an example of 
unnecessary, much less pathological, federalization. There are 
important national interests at stake in large cases with multistate 
elements, and prior law did allow plaintiffs, through manipulation of 
prior jurisdictional rules, to keep some of those cases of genuine 
national significance out of federal court.203 And agree or disagree with 
CAFA’s expansion of subject-matter jurisdiction, Congress is not 
treading close to constitutional boundaries.204 Further, and somewhat 
ameliorating worries about imbalanced legislative influence, there are 
institutional forces that can be expected to lobby Congress against 
proposed expansions of jurisdiction: namely the federal judiciary, 
which has in fact fought against expansion and in favor of curtailment 
in the past.205 For these reasons, my view is that it is too early to 
declare an epidemic of pathological jurisdictional expansionism 
serious enough to justify the strong medicine of a counter-canon aimed 
at suppressing it.  
E. The Canon as Good Policy 
Congress is the primary policymaker in fields governed by 
statutory law, but questions of policy present themselves for judicial 
resolution when Congress leaves them open. Indeed, because there is 
no administrative agency charged with implementing jurisdictional 
statutes, any congressionally unresolved policy choices are left for 
judicial decision, subject as always to the possibility of congressional 
revisitation. A substantive canon can reflect a judicial determination 
(independent of legislative preferences) that a certain outcome is 
 
 202.  Cf. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 
2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1934–36 (2008) (discussing various positive and negative appraisals of 
CAFA’s relationship to federalism). 
 203.  See Stephen C. Yeazell, Overhearing Part of a Conversation: Shutts as a Moment in a 
Long Dialogue, 74 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780, 794–95 (2006) (presenting a critique of CAFA 
according to which it does too little to federalize cases of national significance). 
 204.  See supra Section II.B. 
 205.  See infra text accompanying notes 232–233. 
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beneficial and that the outcome’s desirability is regular enough that 
the policy choice can be made, not in every case afresh, but in the form 
of a generally applicable interpretive presumption. Whether the 
jurisdiction canon can be justified in this fashion therefore depends on 
whether it promotes good outcomes.206 Needless to say, whether the 
canon has a good effect is a hard, multi-dimensional question. One 
must consider what values the canon might serve and how those 
benefits match up against corresponding losses on other dimensions. 
The jurisdiction canon is usually justified through appeals to 
the value of preserving state authority,207 but first let us briefly deal 
with another value. Restricting federal jurisdiction might be thought 
to advance the goal of judicial restraint.208 As the Supreme Court has 
often emphasized in the related contexts of standing and justiciability, 
courts should play a limited role in a democratic society, with more 
authority properly residing with the more representative branches of 
government.209 Still, the goal of judicial restraint cannot by itself 
justify the narrow-construction canon, as restricting federal judicial 
jurisdiction generally just expands the authority of state judges. 
Judicial power is exercised either way. One therefore needs to explain 
why it is important to restrain federal judges in particular. In other 
words, an argument based on judicial restraint naturally leads back to 
an argument about federalism, particularly federalism in its judicial 
dimension. 
Is it valuable to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts in 
order to preserve state authority? The answer depends on one’s 
assessment of the relative qualities of the federal and state courts and 
what one thinks the federal courts are for. If, as some have argued, 
the federal courts are better in important respects, if they are critically 
important in certain kinds of cases,210 then we ought to err on the side 
of greater access, such as by reading jurisdictional statutes broadly or 
at least neutrally. But of course whether the federal courts are 
 
 206.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 412 (1989) (“When interpretive norms are contested, and when neither the Constitution nor 
the Congress has specified the proper norms, there is no alternative but to base the inevitably 
value-laden choice among them on their role in improving or impairing governmental 
performance.”). 
 207.  See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).   
 208.  See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1937–39 
(2008).  
 209.  E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
 210.  See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Martin H. 
Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection: Due 
Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1 (2014). 
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better—and what criteria are appropriate for judging quality—would 
make a good topic for an unending debate, for every supposed virtue of 
the federal courts can be recast as a vice. Are federal courts superior 
because they provide high-caliber judging that is free from local 
prejudices, or are they too remote (in multiple senses) from the people 
and too favorable toward the well-heeled? The answers to those 
questions depend on whom one asks, as well as the era in which one 
asks them. 
Another policy consideration, less lofty but probably more 
practically important, concerns caseload. If broad interpretations of 
jurisdictional statutes would threaten to overwhelm the federal courts’ 
limited capacity, that provides a reason to adopt rules that tend to 
restrict their jurisdiction and shrink their dockets. There are objective 
facts one can consult on these points—case filings per judge, time to 
disposition, and so forth—and one can compare those figures (suitably 
weighted and contextualized) to the corresponding figures in the state 
courts today or the federal courts of past eras. But the meaning of 
those facts, once again, depends on what the federal courts are for and 
which cases have a claim on their time. Are federal courts supposed to 
be a small, elite body giving special treatment to special cases, or are 
they meant to operate as a broadly available parallel system of 
adjudication? 
If we think sound policy requires reduction of federal caseloads, 
we still face some tricky institutional questions about the relative 
primacy of legislative versus judicial policymaking. As a general 
matter, the legislature’s discernable choices and policies should be 
paramount in statutory domains, with the judiciary’s own 
assessments of policy playing a subsidiary role. But jurisdiction 
arguably presents a special case. On the one hand, the risk that 
judicial self-interest may assert itself militates in favor of greater 
deference to legislative decisions about caseload. On the other hand, if 
the proper functioning of the federal courts is threatened by docket 
pressures, and if the judiciary rather than Congress is well positioned 
to appreciate the threat, then judicial self-help might be warranted. 
As stated in the previous Section, it seems that the judiciary has 
meaningful access to the legislative process. To that extent, courts 
should not aggressively assert their own preferences about jurisdiction 
in the course of adjudicating disputes over the scope of the 
legislature’s statutes. 
It is worth observing that one could fashion different policy-
based interpretive rules for different types of jurisdiction. One might 
believe that federal-question cases, as compared to diversity cases, 
have a stronger claim on federal judicial resources. If so, it is 
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conceivable that one could have a narrow-construction rule for certain 
categories but not others. I return to this possibility of a splintered 
canon below and express some doubts about its viability.211 
The discussion of policy has so far assumed that the 
jurisdiction canon makes a meaningful difference to the allocation of 
cases between judicial systems, such that abandoning the canon would 
mean more cases in federal court. A skeptic would doubt that the 
canon, like judicial rhetorical conventions generally, has much of an 
effect on outcomes. And even the devout legalist recognizes that 
canons are important only at the margin in the close cases that are 
not clearly resolved by text or precedent.212 Further, the vast majority 
of disputes are settled, often very early in the proceedings, so 
changing the jurisdictional rules could affect the terms on which cases 
settle more than it affects how much work federal judges must do. 
Still, the lower courts receive many thousands of cases, and so even if 
the canon affects only a small minority of them, that could still have a 
meaningful effect on federal caseloads (albeit a less meaningful effect 
than, say, a decision to leave more drug prosecutions to state courts). 
There are other considerations that cannot be evaluated simply 
by calculating the canon’s practical impacts on case allocation. 
Continuing to embrace the canon—or even more so, rejecting it—has 
symbolic value as a manner of expressing the system’s attitudes about 
the proper role of the federal and state courts. Expressive effects are 
valid considerations in the policy calculus. 
F. Reducing Decision Costs 
Another sort of justification for the canons, also policy based 
but focused inward at the judiciary itself, is that canons can act as 
shortcuts that reduce the complexity of judicial decisionmaking.213 
Suppose a judge’s initial examination of the most directly relevant 
interpretive materials (the text, binding precedent) does not yield a 
clear answer to an interpretive problem. When this happens, the judge 
can always engage in further research and thinking about which 
interpretation is best, an effort that might result in a slight increase 
in the quality of the decision. Alternatively, the court could turn to a 
 
 211.  See infra Section II.G. 
 212.  Recall that our assumption is that abandoning the jurisdiction canon would not mean 
overturning long-standing, solidly entrenched precedents such as the “complete diversity” 
interpretation of the diversity statute. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 179–80, 201–02 (2006); 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial 
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 657–60 (1992). 
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canon that directs the court to pick one outcome rather than another 
and be done with it. This latter approach would reduce the cost of 
making the decision. If courts consistently take this approach, then 
litigants might be able to spend less time researching every 
conceivable interpretive argument and might even be able to predict 
outcomes more reliably. 
The decision-simplifying potential of a substantive canon 
depends on the interpretive contributions and costs associated with 
the sources of meaning it would replace, and in that light the 
jurisdiction canon does not seem especially valuable. True, the general 
jurisdictional grants, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s grant of federal-
question jurisdiction and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s grant of diversity 
jurisdiction, are phrased in broad but imprecise language that leaves 
many questions textually unanswered. But these jurisdictional 
statutes are also so old that there is abundant precedent, which even 
when not directly controlling still provides powerful analogues. 
Precedent is not so plentiful for new enactments, but for those newer 
statutes the statutory purposes and legislative history might be clear 
enough to lessen the need for the shortcut represented by a 
substantive canon.214 
If a canon’s chief function is to serve as a decisionmaking 
shortcut, the direction in which the canon points is only of secondary 
importance. A canon governing jurisdictional statutes could point 
toward either liberality or strictness as long as it does so clearly. But 
because the current narrow-construction canon for jurisdiction coheres 
with various federalism-protecting substantive canons and other 
interpretive rules limiting judicial power,215 perhaps the current canon 
is a better choice than a contrary rule, from the perspective of 
simplifying decisionmaking.216 And because the anti-jurisdiction canon 
is pretty well entrenched now, there would be some hassle involved in 
switching the system over to a canon that pointed the opposite 
direction. Some error and uncertainty would attend the transition 
period. The prospect of such transition costs would provide some 
grounds not to undertake the switch. 
 
 214.  See supra text accompanying notes 193–196 (discussing recent congressional 
enactments and proposals aimed at expanding federal jurisdiction). 
 215.  See supra notes 168–171 and accompanying text (citing examples of canons that 
promote federalism). 
 216.  See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012) (explaining that the Supreme Court often 
seeks to avoid interpretative approaches that will prove difficult for the lower courts to 
administer). 
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G. Summary of Normative Considerations 
We have considered a variety of potential justifications for the 
jurisdiction canon. It is now time to try to bring together the various 
threads of analysis. 
To begin with, it is well to remember that most questions under 
the jurisdictional statutes, especially in the lower courts, have already 
been settled. In considering whether the canon is justified, and on 
what grounds, one should therefore think primarily about its role in 
construing new and recent enactments and in resolving lingering 
uncertainties in old statutes. 
Several considerations that frequently support substantive 
canons provide at best meager support for the jurisdiction canon. The 
canon is not necessary, except rarely, to avoid close constitutional calls 
or to provide a margin of safety around a constitutional boundary; in 
those rare instances in which it is, one could simply rely on the more 
general canon of avoiding constitutional doubts. Neither does the 
jurisdiction canon advance congressional preferences in a significant 
way: to the limited extent congressional preferences are discernible, 
today they probably favor expansive interpretations of the close calls 
in federal jurisdiction. 
Precedent supplies only modest support for the canon. This is 
true even setting aside questions about whether interpretive 
methodology is the sort of thing that can be binding law in the formal 
sense. Even if methodology can be, or already is, that sort of thing, the 
jurisdiction canon is not law that generates much reliance. To the 
extent there would be costs associated with abrogating the canon, they 
would mostly be temporary switching costs of the sort that accompany 
any shift in law (the burden of learning the new rules, updating 
language in boilerplate motions, changing treatises, etc.). 
Potentially the strongest support for the jurisdiction canon 
comes from policy considerations of various sorts. If it is a good thing 
for federal courts to exercise less rather than more authority, then the 
canon is valuable. Whether one thinks that is a good thing is likely to 
depend on deeper ideological commitments that are themselves the 
subject of abiding disagreement. As Professor Richard Fallon 
explained, the law of the federal courts contains two long-persisting 
but incompatible ideologies—one Federalist and one Nationalist—
each of which captures some of the truth but neither of which is able 
to vanquish the other.217 That sort of conflict does not make for a 
 
 217.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 
1142–45 (1988). 
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stable foundation on which to rest a canon of interpretation. Without a 
solid normative consensus supporting it, the canon is vulnerable to the 
forces of the moment. Caseload considerations might provide a 
sturdier, less contentious policy basis for the canon, at least if we 
believe all of the following: that federal caseloads would significantly 
increase without the canon, that this would be a bad thing on net, and 
that the courts may exercise self-help in the form of an interpretive 
canon. 
One might hope to reach a more definitive (if complex) 
conclusion on the canon’s value by disaggregating different types of 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction canon has traditionally applied to 
jurisdictional statutes generally, and to removal most especially, but 
one could retain the canon for some types of jurisdiction and abolish it 
for others. Dart Cherokee has already moved us in this direction by 
abrogating the canon in CAFA cases. Yet creating multiple and 
divergent canons from one canon does not seem especially attractive. 
Continuing to slice up the jurisdictional statutes into favored and 
disfavored groups will add complexity and uncertainty, which would 
run contrary to the coherence-promoting and cost-reducing functions 
of the canons. 
Different readers may evaluate the various potential 
justifications differently, but my own sense is that the case for the 
jurisdiction canon presents a close call. If it is close, then the outcome 
may depend on how one assigns the burden of justification. For some, 
substantive canons are inherently suspect, given their status as 
atextual judicial creations. Others, especially those whose 
temperaments are cautious and conservative, will linger long over the 
fact that the canon has been employed for many years without 
consequences so notably bad as to justify the risks of upending settled 
patterns of jurisprudence. 
III. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING THE JURISDICTION CANON’S PATH 
Having examined the jurisdiction canon’s uncertain normative 
merits, we turn next to some positive matters: explaining the forces 
that have been shaping the canon’s path and that can be expected to 
do so in the future. 
The normative and positive inquiries are linked, of course. If 
there are powerful normative arguments for the canon—for example, a 
strong case based on stare decisis or a compelling policy rationale—
then those can be expected to help the canon’s standing, because at 
least some courts would recognize the force of the normative 
arguments. By the same token, if the precedent-based argument 
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crumbles under scrutiny, Congress disavows the canon, and the canon 
is terrible as a policy matter, courts should recognize that too. But 
courts, like other institutions and agents, are motivated by a variety of 
factors, and there is no guarantee they will follow the normatively 
correct course even where there is one. And here, as we have just seen, 
the normative case is itself uncertain. 
The following pages will consider factors that can help to 
explain and predict the federal courts’ treatment of the jurisdiction 
canon. For most of the Roberts Court era, the canon has faced some 
structural and ideological headwinds. Some of those features remain 
in place, but the canon’s future is hard to predict at the moment given 
that the Supreme Court is set to experience some potentially 
important changes in personnel. Strange as it may seem, the 
jurisdiction canon could be a subject, like abortion and the Eleventh 
Amendment, regarding which the political commitments of new 
appointees can make a difference. 
A. Precedent and Inertia 
Precedent was one consideration in the normative evaluation of 
the jurisdiction canon, and precedent, along with the simple inertia of 
the status quo, also figures in the positive analysis. In predicting the 
canon’s fate, and particularly in assessing the role of factors like 
precedent in determining that fate, it is important to distinguish 
between the likely actions of the Supreme Court on the one hand and 
the lower federal courts on the other hand. Both types of courts play a 
role in methodological change, but they play their roles differently. 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to feel very constrained to 
follow the narrow-construction canon if the canon is inconvenient in a 
particular case or uncongenial to its preferences more generally. Even 
if canons enjoy precedential effect, the Court has the power to narrow 
or outright overrule its own precedents.218 Further, the Court’s own 
pronouncements over the last decade or so—questioning the canon’s 
continued validity in Breuer, stating that “ordinary principles” apply 
in Exxon Mobil, and calling the canon merely a “purported” rule in 
Dart Cherokee219—have shown a distinct lack of commitment to the 
canon. 
The lower courts face a different, more constrained world. If 
the Supreme Court expressly repudiates the canon, then we could 
 
 218.  See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 618 (1988) (listing examples of 
statutory precedents that were overruled). 
 219.  See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
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expect the lower courts to follow suit. But what about in the 
meantime? Can we expect the lower courts to take the lead in 
overthrowing the jurisdiction canon? Through its statements 
questioning and narrowing the canon, the Supreme Court has invited 
lower courts and litigants to unsettle the status quo.220 Yet there are 
good reasons to expect the lower courts to be reluctant to accept that 
invitation. Instead, they will mostly continue to embrace the narrow-
construction canon, except in CAFA cases (where Dart Cherokee 
expressly abrogated it). The lower courts will do this, as the following 
paragraphs explain, regardless of whether they regard interpretive 
rules and canons as precedentially binding in the formal sense (a 
matter of significant controversy, as discussed above221). 
First, if lower courts do regard canons as precedential in the 
normal ways, then the canon should remain binding in non-CAFA 
contexts. Although the Supreme Court in Dart Cherokee abrogated the 
canon in CAFA cases and questioned whether there is a presumption 
against removal in other cases, the Court expressly refrained from 
repudiating the canon in non-CAFA contexts.222 As noted above, there 
are older Supreme Court cases stating such a canon, and there is 
certainly plenty of circuit precedent embracing one.223 The lower 
courts lack power to overrule Supreme Court decisions even when the 
Supreme Court has hinted at their vulnerability,224 and a court of 
appeals panel probably cannot overturn circuit law embracing the 
canon based merely on the Supreme Court’s statement that the Court 
regards the question as open.225 Therefore, the canon should persist in 
non-CAFA contexts, and that is what I have observed in the initial 
decisions responding to Dart Cherokee.226 
 
 220.  Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and 
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 785–89 (2012) 
(observing that one way the Supreme Court can initiate doctrinal change is by inviting litigants 
to challenge a precedent or Congress to overrule it); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court 
Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 956, 967 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
sometimes invites lower courts to read its precedents narrowly in order to provoke doctrinal 
change). 
 221.  See supra Section II.A.2.a. 
 222.  Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (“[The lower 
court] relied, in part, on a purported ‘presumption’ against removal. We need not here decide 
whether such a presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases.” (citation omitted)). 
 223.  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 224.  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 225.  There are different ways to phrase the standard for overruling circuit precedent in light 
of new Supreme Court cases, with some phrasings more stringent than others. See Mead, supra 
note 122, at 797–98 (citing examples). 
 226.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. CV15-00202-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 
1442644, at *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2015) (stating that Dart Cherokee did not alter the normal 
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Second, if canons are not treated as precedent, and even if the 
canons are denied the force of some sort of persuasive dicta, there is 
still ample reason to suppose that the jurisdiction canon will have 
significant staying power in the lower courts merely by virtue of 
inertia. Judges are human, after all, and we humans are creatures of 
habit. Certain legal issues arise so frequently that the rules for 
resolving those issues, along with the habits of mind that accompany 
them, become routinized and virtually automatic. Standards of review 
and other common legal frameworks are often set forth in boilerplate 
language that is simply copied from one decision to the next.227 
Statements of the general principles of federal jurisdiction are also 
frequently needed (in theory, jurisdiction is necessarily considered in 
every case), and so jurisdictional principles naturally lend themselves 
to copying from one case to the next. In fact, I have found copious 
evidence of such jurisdictional boilerplate in district court decisions; 
lots of judges use the same language over and over in setting forth the 
basic rules of jurisdiction, including the rule that federal jurisdiction 
is narrowly construed.228 To be clear, using such boilerplate language 
is not necessarily a bad practice: there is little reason for a judge (or 
law clerk) to reinvent the wheel by drafting a new version of the 
standard for granting summary judgment in every case, and the same 
thing is true here. 
The discussion above provides some reasons to expect the lower 
courts largely to adhere to the jurisdiction canon despite its weakness 
in the Supreme Court, but it is worth remembering that the lower 
courts are a “they” rather than an “it”—and a big and diverse “they” at 
that. Although most post–Dart Cherokee lower-court decisions have 
tended to downplay or ignore the Supreme Court’s invitations to 
reconsider the canon in non-CAFA cases, some cracks in the canon’s 
foundations have started to appear.229 It does not take much to further 
 
presumption in non-CAFA cases); Madison v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C-14-4934-EMC, 2015 WL 
355984, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that “nothing in Dart calls into question or 
undermines existing Ninth Circuit precedent that in a [non-CAFA case] the court must resolve 
all ambiguity in favor of remand” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 227.  See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 255–56 (2009); Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 153, 169 (2012). 
 228.  To pick just one example, a number of decisions of Magistrate Judge James of the 
Northern District of California contain the same or similar passages reciting basic jurisdictional 
rules. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Chappell, No. C 11-4640 MEJ, 2011 WL 5150699, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Abitsch & Abitsch LLC v. Wanigatunga, No. C 11-4833 MEJ, 2011 
WL 4715159, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 229.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of Okmulgee, No. 15-CV-470-JHP, 2016 WL 2944667, at *1 
n.1 (E.D. Okla. May 20, 2016) (applying the narrow-construction canon but noting that “the 
United States Supreme Court has called this rule of construction into question”); Bruning v. City 
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unsettle the law. If a few lower courts begin rejecting the canon or 
some lower-court judges write separate opinions calling on the 
Supreme Court to clarify its status, those actions will provide ready 
fodder for petitions for certiorari and amicus briefs that, in turn, 
encourage the Court to opine once more on the canon’s contemporary 
validity. 
B. Caseload Considerations 
To the extent the jurisdiction canon affects the workload of the 
federal courts—narrow interpretation of jurisdictional statutes should 
reduce caseloads, other things equal—it affects the judiciary’s own 
interests. Those caseload-related interests are conflicting, however. 
On the one hand, more expansive jurisdiction has the potential to 
increase judicial authority, such that one might expect a self-
aggrandizing judiciary to favor a canon of broad interpretation. On the 
other hand, a rule of narrow construction is attractive for a judiciary 
that has an interest in limiting its workload.230 Recall in this regard 
that caseload concerns helped to get the narrow-construction canon off 
the ground in the late nineteenth century.231 Higher caseloads 
threaten—or at least the federal judges believe they threaten—the 
quality of Article III adjudication and the prestige of the federal 
judiciary.232 The federal judiciary has at times officially advocated 
curtailment of jurisdiction and has lobbied Congress against creating 
new federal claims.233 
In assessing where these contending forces for and against 
jurisdiction come to rest, it is useful to remember that the federal 
judiciary is not a monolith. The modern Supreme Court most certainly 
 
of Guthrie, 101 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1145–46 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (questioning the continued vitality 
of the presumption against removal jurisdiction and suggesting that the Tenth Circuit reconsider 
its jurisprudence).  
 230.  See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 
65 DUKE L.J. 1, 63 (2015) (stating that limiting caseloads is “central to [the federal courts’] 
conception of [their] institutional interest”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging 
Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 570–
71 (2007) (observing that docket pressures may lead lower courts to “under-interpret 
jurisdictional statutes and to over-interpret doctrinal exceptions thereto”). 
 231.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
 232.  See Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism As Docket Control, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 7, 53–69 (2015) (discussing the Judicial Conference’s 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal 
Courts and its emphasis on maintaining the quality of the federal judiciary by limiting 
caseloads); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3–4 (arguing that the federal courts were meant to have a “limited 
role reserved for issues where important national interests predominate”). 
 233.  See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating 
the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). 
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shows a strong interest in limiting the number of cases it hears. Its 
jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary, and it uses that discretion 
to hear fewer cases than it used to.234 Beyond restricting the number 
of cases it hears, it uses various devices to limit and shape the precise 
questions that it decides.235 Because of the Court’s discretion to limit 
and control its docket, it can insulate itself from caseload pressures in 
the lower courts. Broader jurisdiction merely increases the “menu” 
from which the Court can choose in selecting whatever small number 
of cases it wishes to decide. The courts of appeals and district courts, 
by contrast, largely exercise jurisdiction that parties can invoke as a 
matter of right. Given this asymmetry, the Supreme Court’s caseload 
need not bear any close relationship to the lower courts’ caseloads; an 
expansion of federal jurisdiction need not burden the Supreme Court 
at all. 
The analysis above suggests that the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts might have somewhat different views regarding what 
kind of jurisdiction canon advances their respective institutional 
interests. The lower courts might prefer narrow interpretations of 
jurisdictional statutes in order to prevent themselves from being 
overwhelmed. The Supreme Court, while not insensitive to the plight 
of its Article III colleagues below, has a countervailing interest in 
broader interpretations that expand its pool of potential candidates for 
the exercise of discretionary power. In fact, the courts’ behavior may 
reveal these divergent preferences in action. As described above, the 
lower courts embrace the narrow-construction canon with a degree of 
gusto that seems rather extreme given the Supreme Court’s mild 
encouragements; more recently, they have been a bit slow to catch on 
to the Supreme Court’s skepticism toward the narrow-construction 
canon.236 The existence of some foot-dragging in this context is 
consistent with other research showing that lower courts tend to resist 
changes in the legal status quo that have the effect of increasing their 
workload.237 
The analysis of caseload considerations comes to a conclusion 
similar to the conclusion reached above in connection with stare 
 
 234.  The Justices were not merely passive bystanders to legislative acts reducing the 
Court’s mandatory docket in favor of discretionary jurisdiction. Rather, they lobbied for those 
changes. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000). 
 235.  See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 683–711 (2012). 
 236.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
 237.  See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 
912–13, 934–40 (2015). 
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decisis: lower courts may have grounds to preserve the narrow-
construction canon, but the Supreme Court does not necessarily 
respond to the same forces. 
C. Litigation Environment 
The path of the law can shift one way or the other depending 
on which subset of potential disputes ultimately make their way to the 
courts. For example, one could expect a rule to migrate in a pro-
plaintiff direction if the cases in which courts are called upon to apply 
and further refine the rule are cases featuring the “best” plaintiffs, 
that is, the plaintiffs with the strongest legal arguments or the most 
compelling factual circumstances.238 Something similar can be true of 
interpretive canons: they are partly products of their environment, 
with their development being helped or hindered depending on the 
diet of interpretive questions the courts ingest. Although Congress 
rarely seeks to dictate interpretive canons directly,239 the laws it 
enacts indirectly influence the prospects of different canons by 
shaping the types of questions that will be litigated. 
The nature of the jurisdictional disputes that have been coming 
before the federal courts for the last decade could be expected, other 
things being equal, to favor broad understandings of federal 
jurisdiction. Most of the recent legislative activity in the field of 
jurisdiction has been in the direction of expansion, with CAFA 
representing the most significant example.240 CAFA creates a bad 
environment for the flourishing of the narrow-construction canon. 
Congress intended CAFA to expand federal jurisdiction and even 
directed courts to interpret the new jurisdictional provisions 
broadly.241 Even before Dart Cherokee, a few courts saw CAFA as 
changing the normal rules of strict interpretation.242 Now that the 
 
 238.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 
(2006) (explaining that the particularities of individual disputes can distort the process of rule 
formation). 
 239.  But cf. Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? 
When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 847–54 (2009) 
(citing instances in which Congress has enacted various types of interpretive directions). 
 240.  See supra Section II.C. 
 241.  See supra text accompanying notes 193–194. 
 242.  E.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-4, 581 
F Supp. 2d 581, 584–85, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that courts should interpret CAFA’s 
exceptions narrowly because Congress intended to expand jurisdiction). A larger number of 
courts disagreed and ruled that CAFA did not alter the interpretive landscape; these courts 
applied the traditional rule that jurisdiction should be construed narrowly even in CAFA cases. 
E.g., Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 336 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008); Miedema v. 
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Supreme Court has emphasized CAFA’s jurisdiction-expanding 
purpose and even quoted the legislative history calling for broad 
interpretation,243 the playing field has shifted, at least in CAFA 
cases.244 
The existence of CAFA, with its pro-jurisdiction thrust, is bad 
news for the narrow-construction canon more generally, even outside 
of CAFA cases. CAFA was the most important and far-reaching 
amendment to the jurisdictional statutes in recent history, and, like 
most important and complicated statutes, it is generating plenty of 
interpretive disputes in its early years.245 As a result, many of the 
tough, unresolved jurisdictional questions reaching the courts today 
stem from CAFA. The Supreme Court has already heard a few CAFA 
cases,246 but it probably is not done with them, and the lower courts 
are certainly not done sorting out CAFA’s complexities.247 To be sure, 
it is possible to decide CAFA cases without abrogating the narrow-
construction canon in its more general non-CAFA applications. But to 
the extent that many of the novel jurisdiction-related cases will 
involve CAFA or other jurisdictional expansions that may be 
forthcoming, the canon will find little sustenance in the near to 
medium term. 
The flow of cases into the federal courts is not only a feature of 
the laws Congress enacts. Strategic selection of cases by savvy 
litigators and certiorari-wielding Justices plays a role too, as the next 
Section explores. 
 
Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328–30 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 
1090, 1097 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 243.  Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). 
 244.  See, e.g., Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Applying this 
binding precedent from the Supreme Court [i.e., the Dart Cherokee case], we may no longer rely 
on any presumption in favor of remand in deciding CAFA jurisdictional questions.”). 
 245.  See Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and Federalized Ambiguity: The 
Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 234 (2011) 
(“Millions of dollars in legal fees, along with a great deal of litigants’ and judges’ time, have been 
spent trying to unravel CAFA’s statutory framework and its practical meaning.”). 
 246.  In addition to deciding Dart Cherokee, the Court decided a CAFA case in each of the 
previous two terms. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) 
(interpreting CAFA’s “mass action” provision in the context of a case brought by a state); 
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (applying CAFA’s amount-in-
controversy provision to a plaintiff’s pre-certification stipulation that the proposed class will seek 
less than the jurisdictional amount). 
 247.  E.g., Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting split with Third 
Circuit over interpretation of CAFA’s local-event exception). 
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D. Judicial Ideology and Business Interests 
Is judicial decisionmaking the product of law or politics? Any 
reasonably subtle observer recognizes that it is some combination of 
both.248 The relative contribution of each input depends on such 
factors as the clarity of the formal legal materials, the salience of the 
issue, and the nature of the court. Policy and values generally play a 
greater role, and formal legal constraints a lesser role, as one moves 
up the judicial hierarchy.249 
The usual blending of law and ideology applies to courts’ use of 
substantive canons and presumptions in statutory interpretation. 
Although substantive canons often find inspiration in constitutional 
emanations, statutory policies, or other public values external to the 
judiciary, in a meaningful sense the canons are judicial inventions.250 
After all, there are lots of policies and values to choose from, but the 
judiciary decides which ones are actually realized as canons and what 
form the canon takes. Moreover, although certain canons eventually 
become established aspects of the interpretive regime, possessed of 
some law-like grip independent of the whims of any particular judge, 
the nature of canons is such that individual cases often afford 
significant wiggle room regarding whether to invoke a canon and how 
much force to give it. In making those choices, just like other choices, 
judges are influenced by their own interests and preferences—and this 
is especially true on the Supreme Court, where legal constraints are 
looser.251 So, in studying the path of the jurisdiction canon, we might 
ask what judges, and Justices in particular, want when it comes to 
jurisdiction. 
The scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction has ideological 
significance along several dimensions. Jurisdiction is power, and thus 
interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes affect the judicial 
dimension of federalism, the principle regulating the allocation of 
 
 248.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78–92 (2008) (describing judges as 
“occasional legislators”). The classic dichotomy is of course a simplification on a number of fronts. 
Other factors play a role as well: the idiosyncratic experiences of individual judges, path 
dependencies, sheer chance, etc. And distinguishing between law and politics is not 
straightforward either. 
 249.  See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 9–10. 
 250.  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 213, at 649 (arguing that “the canons can be 
understood best as devices that were designed to serve the self-interest of their inventors—the 
judiciary”). 
 251.  See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 159–
79 (2009) (showing the influence of ideology in statutory interpretation); Brudney & Ditslear, 
supra note 20 (showing that canon use is influenced by the Justices’ policy preferences). 
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authority between the nation and the states.252 Judges with a 
principled commitment to the primacy of state governments, or a 
principled commitment to restraints on the unelected federal 
judiciary, should favor principles that tend to reduce the scope of 
federal jurisdiction. Judges who are suspicious of local authority and 
fear that state judges are unduly accountable will prefer the 
centralization and relative insulation of the federal judiciary. But 
federal jurisdiction also has political stakes in the somewhat less lofty 
sense that the availability of the federal forum helps some identifiable 
types of litigants and hurts others. Federal jurisdiction has always 
been a tool for advancing social and economic interests—at the 
Founding, during the Civil War, at Reconstruction’s end, in the New 
Deal253—and so we should not be surprised to see it remain so today. 
The preferred forum for any particular group shifts over time 
as social circumstances and the composition of the judiciary 
changes.254 In the 1960s and 1970s, federal court was generally 
regarded as the superior forum for those seeking to advance civil 
rights, sue manufacturers of defective products, or pursue other 
“liberal” goals.255 In more recent times, some of those preferences have 
changed. Although generalizations are perilous, today the federal 
court has become the preferred venue for business defendants trying 
to fight off consumer class actions, employment-discrimination cases, 
and similar civil suits.256 Businesses and their advocates therefore 
naturally tend to favor laws and doctrines that expand access to that 
favored federal forum. Business interests succeeded in expanding 
diversity jurisdiction in 2005 through CAFA.257 The debate over CAFA 
was in part a debate about procedural values of fairness and 
efficiency, but it was also thoroughly political, including in the 
partisan sense. Business interests lobbied heavily for the law, and 
 
 252.  HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM xi (1953) (“The jurisdiction of courts in a federal system is an aspect of the distribution of 
power between the states and the federal government.”).  
 253.  See, e.g., supra notes 68–84 and accompanying text (discussing political influences on 
jurisdictional policy stemming from the Civil War and Reconstruction). 
 254.  See PURCELL, supra note 75, at vii (explaining that “litigation strategies and patterns, 
like other social phenomena, are historically specific”). 
 255.  Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the 
Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1528–29 (2005); Neuborne, supra 
note 210, at 1109–10; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The 
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1849–50 (2008). 
 256.  See Morrison, supra note 255, at 1529 (“[T]he general perceptions about state and 
federal judges are now quite the opposite of what they once were. . . . [I]n general, defense 
counsel look on having a federal judge in a case as a plus, whereas counsel for plaintiffs, not 
surprisingly, take the opposite view.”).  
 257.  Purcell, supra note 255, at 1856–57. 
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almost all congressional Republicans voted in favor; consumer groups, 
environmental organizations, unions, and other traditionally left-
leaning interest groups mostly opposed the law, as did most 
Democrats.258 Jurisdiction became another avenue for tort reform. 
A judge’s preferences regarding the extent of federal 
jurisdiction can be internally conflicted, as when a judge values state 
authority as a matter of constitutional principle but also prefers a 
civil-liability system that protects business interests. On the Supreme 
Court today, when it comes to high-stakes matters involving the civil 
litigation system, the lower politics of consumers-and-employees-
versus-business clash with and sometimes trump the higher principles 
of federalism. In important preemption cases, for example, disputes 
often pit a consumer or employee seeking to rely on plaintiff-protective 
state law versus a business invoking the preemptive effect of a weaker 
federal standard.259 When the Court closely divides on these issues, 
the Court’s more conservative members tend to favor federal authority 
and protection of business, while the more liberal members tend to 
support state power and protection of plaintiffs.260 While it would go 
too far to say that principles such as federalism are mere rhetorical 
devices to be cast aside when inconvenient, the driving force in many 
close cases about civil litigation is the politics of whether one favors 
larger and surer recoveries for consumers and employees on the one 
hand or limited liability for the members of the Chamber of Commerce 
on the other. 
Given the political nature of disputes over jurisdiction, it is 
perhaps understandable that the traditional canon of narrow 
construction of jurisdictional statutes can itself become politicized. 
That the jurisdiction canon is unfavorable to business interests 
probably helps to explain the Supreme Court’s skepticism toward the 
canon over the last decade or so. The Chamber of Commerce does not 
win every time, but the Roberts Court has been unusually receptive to 
its interests.261 A Supreme Court that is concerned about the plight of 
corporate defendants in state courts can therefore be expected, in the 
 
 258.  Id. at 1861–63. 
 259.  E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (considering whether the 
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California rule restricting use of class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (considering whether FDA approval of 
a drug’s warning label preempts a state-court jury’s finding that the drug maker was liable for 
inadequate warnings). 
 260.  See generally Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2014) 
(showing that the Justices on both sides of the Court frequently abandon their commitments to 
federalism in cases involving civil litigation).  
 261.  See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1431, 1472 (2013). 
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close cases, to favor broader federal subject-matter jurisdiction and 
(whether as cause or effect) downplay the jurisdiction canon. Such a 
preference for federal jurisdiction is, to be clear, wholly consistent 
with the “restrictive ethos” that commentators have identified in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in areas such as pleadings, personal 
jurisdiction, arbitration, and class certification.262 If the federal courts 
are less likely to certify classes, more likely to enforce arbitration 
agreements, and otherwise more favorable to civil defendants, then 
greater access to federal jurisdiction means lower odds of recovery for 
plaintiffs.263 
Of course, the Court’s inclinations toward business interests 
depend on its membership, so one cannot be certain of the future. 
President Trump will appoint at least one Justice. A Republican 
president would ordinarily be expected to appoint pro-business jurists, 
but it is conceivable that he might favor judicial populists or persons 
with unexpected attitudes toward federal jurisdiction. 
The Court does not act in a vacuum, and so it is also relevant to 
the jurisdiction canon’s future that the canon has attracted opponents 
outside of the courts. In particular, the canon has become the target of 
an interest-group campaign. In Dart Cherokee, the recent case about 
removal procedure discussed above,264 the Washington Legal 
Foundation and other pro-business groups filed an amicus brief in 
order to “urge the Court to strongly disavow the existence of a 
presumption against removability.”265 Continuing the campaign in a 
more public forum, an op-ed piece written by one of the brief’s authors 
stated that the case “provides the Court an ideal opportunity to end 
the rule of construction whereby federal courts continue to narrowly 
construe federal removal statutes against the party seeking 
 
 262.  The phrase comes from A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010).  
 263.  See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and 
the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1748–49 (2014). 
 264.  Supra text accompanying notes 105–108. 
 265.  Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, International Association of Defense Counsel, 
and Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24, 
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 
2361914; see also id. at 2 (“Amici are concerned that unless the Court uses this case not only to 
overturn the decision below but also to explain that the lower courts’ recognition of a 
presumption against removal is unfounded, many federal courts will continue to adhere to such a 
presumption.”). This was not the group’s first run at the canon; it had (unsuccessfully) urged the 
Court to repudiate the canon before. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, 6, Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005) (No. 04-
712), 2005 WL 1210236. 
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removal.”266 An amicus brief filed by an organization of defendant-side 
civil litigators similarly urged the Court to repudiate the canon.267 As 
discussed above, the advocacy effort succeeded in part: the Court 
expressly rejected a presumption against removal in the CAFA context 
and questioned its validity more broadly.268 
The industry campaign for easy access to federal court, 
managed by sophisticated repeat players, can be expected to continue. 
As long as federal courts take a more restrictive approach to class 
certification, demand more of plaintiffs at the pleadings stage, or 
grant summary judgment more willingly than the corresponding state 
courts, then business should favor broad access to federal subject-
matter jurisdiction. 
E. Summary of Predictive Considerations 
In light of the analysis above, what is in store for the 
jurisdiction canon? Predictions are always perilous, but some 
comments are possible. 
First, the lower courts have noticed the partial abrogation of 
the jurisdiction canon in Dart Cherokee, but they are unlikely to act 
boldly to repudiate the canon in non-CAFA cases. The canon is 
supported by too much precedent, which the lower courts find 
powerful even if the Supreme Court does not, and whatever the 
canon’s legal status, it has the forces of inertia and habit behind it. 
Moreover, the narrow-construction canon serves the lower courts’ 
interests in reducing their workload. 
Second, the canon faces some serious structural headwinds at 
the moment. CAFA will continue to provide a stream of opportunities 
for the Supreme Court to address open questions of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and CAFA itself is hostile to the canon. Moreover, 
influential business interests have turned against the canon, and 
 
 266.  Rich Samp, High Court Should Not “DIG” Dart Cherokee Basin Case, FORBES (Oct. 21, 
2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/10/21/high-court-should-not-dig-dart-
cherokee-basin-case/ [https://perma.cc/4VLQ-USJG].  
 267.  Brief of DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 3, 11, Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (No. 13-719), 2014 
WL 2465971. Briefs from business groups in a few other recent cases have made similar pleas. 
E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Access to Courts Initiative, Inc., and National Association of 
Manufacturers in Support of Respondents at 34, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 
134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4829339 (arguing that the “Court should repudiate” the 
presumption against removal). 
 268.  Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554 (“We need not here decide whether such a presumption 
[against removal] is proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that no 
antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA . . . .”). 
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these groups have tended to be successful in communicating their 
message to Congress and the contemporary Supreme Court.  
Third, although the jurisdiction canon faces threats, it is 
possible that it will be fragmented rather than abolished. That is, it 
may be that in the future we will have not one jurisdiction canon that 
applies to all jurisdictional statutes but different rules that apply to 
different statutes. For example, CAFA and potential future 
expansions could be interpreted broadly or at least neutrally, while 
older aspects of diversity jurisdiction could continue to be interpreted 
narrowly; different kinds of federal-question claims might be subject 
to varying rules based on the claims’ perceived importance and 
number. Given the dangers the canon faces, this might be the best 
future for which the canon can reasonably hope. 
CONCLUSION 
The canon of narrowly construing jurisdictional statutes has a 
century of history and thousands of citations behind it, but what lies 
ahead of it is not as clear. Whether we ought to have such a canon is 
debatable. The canon does not indirectly enforce the Constitution, it 
probably does not reflect current congressional preferences, and 
reliance interests supporting it are slight. Whether it is desirable 
depends largely on a policy judgment about whether the balance 
between federal and state judicial authority and workloads should 
shade a bit one way or the other. That conflict is hard to resolve and 
harder still to keep resolved, which means it is a shaky foundation for 
a substantive canon. 
However one assesses the jurisdiction canon’s normative 
merits, the canon faces some headwinds purely as a predictive matter. 
The canon faces an environment in which many of the day’s pressing 
jurisdictional questions arise from a statute—CAFA—that was 
expressly designed to expand federal jurisdiction.269 Future legislative 
action seems more likely to involve similar expansions rather than 
curtailments of jurisdiction. Influential pro-business interest groups 
are attacking the jurisdiction canon and lobbying for broader access to 
the federal forum.270 And the Supreme Court has not shown much 
sympathy for the canon over the last decade.271 
The analysis of the jurisdiction canon sheds some light on 
broader issues regarding the nature of interpretive methodology. 
 
 269.  Supra Section III.D. 
 270.  Supra Section III.C. 
 271.  Supra Section II.A.1. 
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First, the canon’s recent history provides some data for the important 
debate over whether interpretive methodology is binding law. The 
lower courts’ responses to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dart 
Cherokee provide some reason to question the prevailing view that 
canons are not law-like: the lower courts treated the Supreme Court’s 
partial abrogation of the canon like binding precedent, and they 
overruled their own prior interpretive canons in response.272 Second, 
the divergence between the lower courts’ heavy use of the canon on the 
one hand and the Supreme Court’s sparing use and skepticism on the 
other hand illustrates that statutory interpretation need not look the 
same throughout our diverse judicial system. Third, the analysis 
illuminates the connection between interpretive canons and legal 
change. Some canons might be timeless, but others evolve with the 
times, much like substantive law. That canons change with the times 
does not show, as the skeptic might think, that they are meaningless. 
On the contrary, canon evolution shows that canons do play a 
meaningful role in legal reasoning, not just because the canons 
themselves directly cause certain outcomes (though sometimes they 
do, especially in lower courts), but because they reflect shifts in the 
Supreme Court’s attitudes and help to communicate those changing 
attitudes through the judicial system. In this regard the canons can 
play a more complicated role than either legalists or skeptics imagine. 
 
 
 272.  See supra Section II.A.2.a. 
